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ABSTRACT 
 
Salchak, Caroline R M.S.Egr., Department of Biomedical and Human Factors Engineering, 
Wright State University, 2014. Eye Tracking and Physiological Measures: An Alternative to 
Mirror Image Bias Detection. 
 
The Mirror Imaging Bias (MIB) is gaining attention as a prominent quality factor 
in analysts’ performance. MIB is an irrationality in which analysts perceive and process 
information through the filter of personal experience. As evidenced by notable historical 
events, the consequences of this bias can be dramatic. A way to understand MIB in 
humans is sought. How analysts analyze data, are trained, and interact with biases is 
explored. An experiment testing for the appearance of MIB was designed and completed. 
Measures from an eye tracker as well as physiological measures were collected. Results 
show a significant correlation between pupil diameter and the appearance of MIB. There 
is a significant correlation between response time as well as the number of fixations and 
the viewpoint of the question. These results support that MIB is used as a shortcut to 
minimize mental workload in decision making in uncertain situations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The Mirror Imaging Bias (MIB) is one of the most prevalent biases among 
analysts and has caused many failures in detecting harmful attacks through assessment 
mishaps. Mirror Imaging and Theory of Mind are understood to be tightly interwoven as 
cognitive biases; they both occur when judging or predicting the actions of a third party. 
Mirror Imaging is an irrationality in which analysts perceive and process information 
through the filter of personal experience; this may be driven in part by cultural 
differences. In the case of Mirror Imaging Bias (MIB), if looking at a situation that 
another person is experiencing, you predict what you would do. In comparison, Theory of 
Mind (ToM) is the ability to predict and interpret the thoughts and actions of another by 
taking on their perspective. In the case of MIB, if looking at a situation that another 
person is experiencing, you predict what they would do.  
 This paper seeks to find an explanation and a way to determine and detect the 
MIB in humans who are faced with the analysis of other cultures and their actions. It will 
do so by looking into past occurrences of the MIB such as the sinking of the Lusitania, 
Pearl Harbor, and 9-11’s attack on the World Trade Center. It will then go into several 
possible reasons on why these failures of analyst work appear so frequently by looking 
into how analysts analyze the data they are given, the training that they receive, and 
cognitive biases that affect the population. When analyzing MIB, this paper will go over 
the three possible reasons for the bias. The first is that MIB is the failure of ToM. ToM is 
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explained and broken down further into 1) inhibition of one’s own self, and 2) belief 
reasoning. The second possible cause for MIB is a cultural bias. It is felt that much of the 
reason behind MIB in analysts is that we assume that other cultures will think and act a 
certain way even though there might be clear evidence otherwise. The third explanation 
for MIB is cognitive action – or mindreading. Mindreading is the activity of representing 
specific mental states of others, for example, their perceptions, goals, beliefs, 
expectations, and the like (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The final part of the paper will go 
into the steps taken toward an experiment: building of the stimuli, testing, and analysis of 
the data collected. Through this experiment it is found that Mirror Imaging Bias is 
enticed 40.1% of the time and Theory of Mind is enticed 21.2% of the time when viewing 
stimuli. Similarly it shows that when comparing the overall results of participants, the 
average pupil diameter shows a significant difference between MIB and ToM and 
therefore would be a good method to detect the bias. However when delving into each 
individual participant, each had different types of data that showed significance to prove 
one bias occurs over the other. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 The following sections will review topics such as the Intelligence Analyst, the 
potential reasons behind their successes and failures, and several cognitive biases that 
affect most people.  
INTELLIGENCE ANALYST 
 The Mirror Imaging Bias isn’t necessarily a well-known problem within the 
mainstream population. However within the Intelligence community, it is extremely 
important. Analysts are well aware of the problems that MI causes. In fact, MI is the most 
common ISR irrationality, is an unavoidable cognitive trap, and has been blamed for 
catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and 9/11 (Pipes, 1995; Heuer, 1999). Well trained 
analysts are able to see that they are falling prey to the bias when they are unwilling to 
examine variants of what they consider most reasonable in light of their personal frame of 
reference (Witlin, 2008), but analysts who haven’t been trained to recognize the signs are 
more likely to partake in the bias. To fully understand the problems that analysts face 
with the Mirror Imaging Bias, we must go in depth into why analysts came to be within 
our government and what their job entails.  
 Intelligence, whether it’s in the United States or in other countries, has only one 
function: to uncover foreign threats to national security. The Central Intelligence Agency 
was created in 1947 with the signing of the National Security Act by President Harry S. 
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Truman. The National Security Act charged the CIA with coordinating the nation’s 
intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence affecting 
national security (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). He [Truman] did so despite 
protests that he was setting up an "American Gestapo." (Pipes, 1995)  Intelligence 
analysis involves predicting thoughts and reactions of allies and adversaries, who often 
have values and beliefs different from those of the analyst. This has been the case 
throughout the years and these differences in beliefs and values have caused plenty of 
issues.  
 There have been many successes and failures that have come from the CIA; these 
will be outlined later in this section. For now we’ll focus on some facts that form around 
what goes into and comes out of the CIA.  
 By far, the largest recipient of intelligence appropriations is the Department of 
Defense. Leaks from Congress in 1995 indicated that of the $28 billion 
budgeted annually for intelligence, the CIA receives only $3 billion (Pipes, 
1995). Clearly this number has changed since then, but it is a good 
representation on how much of a focus the government has on intelligence. 
 The CIA is headed by a Director, who is appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate (Hayden, 2009). 
 They collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate 
means – however they do not exercise police, subpoena, or law enforcement 
powers (Hayden, 2009). 
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 They correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security and 
provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence (Hayden, 2009). 
 There is a 21.4% failure rate of Ops Intelligence Apprentice in the Advanced 
Training. (Casebeer, 2012) These high wash out rates may be due to lack of a 
cognitive flexibility – this includes the MIB. 
 Betts (1978) brought up the point that “Particular failures [for analysts] are 
accorded disproportionate significance if they are considered in isolation rather than in 
terms of the general ratio of failures to successes; the record of success is less striking 
because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen” (Betts, 1978). While 
there have been many successes that have come from analysts – which far outnumber the 
failures – the failures are much more costly and continuously seem to overshadow the 
successes. “There should be absolutely no tolerance of analysts who consistently produce 
flawed assessments or assessments that hedge to the point of being useless” (Pipes, 
1995). Some of the main failures of analysts can be seen outlined below. In each case, as 
suggested by Betts (1978) there are two phenomena that occur: first, “evidence of an 
impending attack was available, but did not flow efficiently up the chains of command,” 
and second, “fragmentary indicators of alarm that did not reach decision makers were 
dismissed because they contradicted strategic estimates or assumptions” (Betts, 1978). 
The MIB is tightly knit into the threads of these failures and will be explained as we go 
along. In each case, it brings to life the phrase “Hindsight is always 20-20.” 
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EXAMPLES OF MIB 
PRE-CIA: 1915: WWI - SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA 
 America had remained neutral during the start of World War One. And although 
America didn’t join the war until two years after the sinking of the Lusitania, it is 
believed that it had a major impact in the relationship between the USA and WWI. In 
1915, the Lusitania set off from New York to Liverpool. The path the ship would take 
brought it directly through a known “European War Zone” in which submarines had 
already brought many ships to their end (Lusitania, ship, 2013). This should have been 
enough to cause pause to potential passengers. On top of that, there were advertisements 
in the New York newspapers paid for by the German Embassy that any ship that sailed 
into the “European War Zone” was a potential target for German submarines. It was 
printed in forty U.S. newspapers as follows:  
“Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that 
a state of war exists between Germany . . . and Great Britain . . . and that 
travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do 
so at their own risk” (The National Archives, n.d.). 
 It is told that many passengers even received anonymous telegrams advising them 
not to travel. However, the passengers dismissed these warnings and “came to the 
conclusion that the luxury liner simply was not a legitimate target of the Germans as it 
had no military value.” The ship was sunk on the 7th of May and only took 18 minutes to 
sink. In a response to the German government, the American government wrote “that no 
warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted 
 
7 
 
as an excuse of palliation for that act or an abatement of the responsibility for its 
commission.” which essentially meant that it was not an excuse to attack the innocent 
people even though a warning was posted (Wilson, 2009). Needless to say, anyone who 
had received the warnings or had seen the advertisements experienced a form of Mirror 
Imaging Bias by assuming that the Lusitania was not going to be a target to the German 
U boats.  
PRE-CIA: 1941: NAZI INVASION OF THE USSR 
On June 22, 1941 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union (“Invasion of the,” 
2013). This was a surprise to not only the Soviet Union, but also to the rest of the world. 
One specific quote by L. Trotsky several years prior to the invasion brings light to the 
false assumption that the Nazi’s would not do such a risky thing: 
“The very possibility of a rule of the Nazis over the German people was 
created by the unbearable tenseness of social antagonisms in Germany. 
These antagonisms have not been removed, and not even weakened, but 
only suppressed, by the lid of fascism. A war will bring them to the 
surface. Hitler has far less chances than had Wilhelm II of carrying a war 
to victory.” (Trotsky, 1937, p. 104) 
As human beings, analysts and decision makers back then had assumed that Hitler 
would make decisions like a “normal” person such as themselves. However, what these 
people failed to notice was the fact that he was from an entirely different background and 
mindset than what they were used to. This is why the Mirror Imaging Bias showed itself 
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in this situation – they assumed incorrectly that Hitler, and therefore the Nazis, would 
make the same decisions that they would. 
PRE-CIA: 1941: WWII – ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR 
 At another turning point in a war – this time World War II – Americans were 
“shocked by the Japanese bombing of the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 
There was mayhem everywhere; over 3,500 Americans were killed or wounded, 350 
aircraft were destroyed or damaged, and all eight battleships of the U.S Pacific Fleet were 
suck or badly damaged” (“Why did japan,” n.d.).  However, even though it seemed as 
though this attack was completely out of the blue, there were signs that seemed extremely 
obvious after the fact. 
 After the attack, analysis revealed that the U.S. had had plenty of information 
about a pending Japanese strike – enough to anticipate and prevent it. However, the U.S 
took no action because it “lacked an organization capable of collating the diffuse bits and 
pieces of intelligence information” (Pipes, 1995). Similarly, Roberta Wohlsetter in her 
1962 study Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision “demonstrated that although the U.S. 
Government picked up Japanese signals (including conversations, decoded cables, and 
ship movements), it failed to distinguish signals from noise. [They were unable] to 
understand which signals were meaningful because it was unimaginable that the Japanese 
might do something as "irrational" as attacking the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific fleet” 
(McFate, 2005). This erroneous assumption is the core of the Mirror Imaging Bias. 
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1962: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
 “In 1962, it [The CIA] denied that Russia intended to install missiles in Cuba up 
to the very moment when photographic imagery proved beyond the shadow of a doubt 
that the missiles were being deployed” (Pipes, 1995). After an American spy plane 
secretly photographed nuclear missile sites being built by the Soviet Union in Cuba, 
President Kennedy did his best to avoid any crisis. He met with his advisors, created a 
blockade around the island, and spoke to the nation about the crisis through a televised 
address (“Cuban missile crisis,” n.d.). There were thirteen days in which the USA and the 
Soviet Union were on the edge of a nuclear crisis (Allison, 1969). Had the crisis not been 
resolved and instead a war started, millions of lives would have been lost.  The Cuban 
Missile Crisis was ended by an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 
which the Soviets would remove the missiles from Cuba and in return the U.S wouldn’t 
invade Cuba. This agreement avoided the possibility of a nuclear war – which would 
have been devastating to both parties. 
 The US might have seen it coming even before the Soviet Union began building 
the sites in Cuba. In the early 60's it could not see any conceivable interest on the part of 
the Soviet Union in placing nuclear missiles in Cuba since Moscow had to be aware that 
the United States would not tolerate such deployments: they were simply "too risky" 
(Pipes, 1995). Even though there might not have been any observable information that 
the U.S. would have seen prior to 1962, they should not have dismissed the Soviet Union 
from doing something such as setting up a nuclear site so close to the United States. 
Doing so placed them within the boundaries of the MIB. 
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1998: INDIA’S NUCLEAR TESTS 
 “The Republican chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence alleged 
Tuesday that U.S. intelligence gathering suffered a "colossal failure" in not detecting 
India's intention to set off three nuclear blasts this week” (Begleiter, 1998). That’s how 
one CNN article described the failure to detect the coming of nuclear tests in India. It 
should have not been a surprise, even though India did a good job of hiding their efforts; 
there were plenty of signs that should have been caught by analysts.  Especially after the 
potential issue for Indian nuclear tests had been given “close scrutiny” in 1995. Similarly, 
India refused to endorse the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in August 
1996, and it had been discussed that they might test nuclear warheads in light of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) advocacy of the ‘Hindu bomb’  (Walker, 1998). The 
Indian government had apparently given repeated warnings of its intentions to proceed 
with nuclear tests (Begleiter, 1998).  
 The major failure was not the fact that when India performed nuclear tests on 11 
and 13 May, 1998 it caught analysts off guard. Again, there were plenty of signs that 
India was prepping for nuclear tests that were missed by analysts. The real problem – and 
consequently the relation to the MIB - was an “assumption by intelligence analysts and 
policymakers that the Indians would not test their nuclear weapons because Americans 
would not test nuclear weapons in similar circumstances” (McFate, 2005). 
2011: 9/11 AND THE BATTLE WITH IRAQ 
 One of the most recent CIA failures came to be within the event of 9/11. The 
entire world seemed to be in shock as they watched the news about how the World Trade 
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Center had been struck by not one, but two, aircraft in the form of a terrorist attack. There 
are countless stories about people who were directly and indirectly affected by what 
happened; still to this day, people rally around the concept of 9/11 and people are still 
touched by the stories that emerge.  
 The chances of this event being prevented are slim. However, analysts could have 
done a better job at anticipating a massive terrorist attack such as this one. There were 
signs leading up to 9/11: the main one that had been released by the White House was the 
fact that on August 6th, a classified review of threats posted by Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda had been placed on the presidents’ desk. Analysts had seen some sort of 
premonition that something was coming, but the White House took no steps to resolve it. 
They thought it was just “bluster” and that they assumed “Bin Laden was merely 
pretending to be planning an attack to distract the administration from Saddam Hussein, 
whom the neoconservatives saw as a greater threat” (Eichenwald, 2012). Again, this 
failure to comprehend beyond what we assume shows the Mirror Imaging Bias. 
 Beyond 9/11 and into the war on terror, U.S. Representative "Ike" Skelton wrote a 
letter Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in which he said: "In simple terms, if we 
had better understood the Iraqi culture and mindset, our war plans would have been even 
better than they were, the plan for the postwar period and all of its challenges would have 
been far better, and we [would have been] better prepared for the 'long slog' ... to win 
peace in Iraq” (McFate, 2005). 
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 Many intelligence failures can be attributed to identifiable and remediable flaws 
of methodology (Pipes, 1995). Failures within the analyst environment can be attributed 
to three separate causes: improper data, lack of training or knowledge of the culture, and 
cognitive biases. 
IMPROPER DATA: LACK OF DATA, POOR DATA, TOO MUCH DATA 
 The first potential reason, of many, failures occur within the analyst environment 
has to do with the data that analysts receive. It is said that the most frequent sources of 
breakdowns in intelligence “lies in the process of amassing timely data, communicating 
them to decision makers, and impressing the latter with the validity or relevance of the 
information” (Betts, 1978). Each individual case is different, but it always seems that the 
data that is given to the analysts isn’t necessarily the best that it could be. It is said that 
for analysts the data analysis, and more specifically divining political intentions from the 
data, is the most difficult aspect (Pipes, 1995). Similarly, in failures of intelligence, the 
most mistakes are made by “decision makers who consume the products of intelligence 
services”, not necessarily by those who collect raw information or those who produce 
analyses (Betts, 1978). Betts makes a point that “optimal decisions in defense policy 
depend on the use of strategic intelligence: the acquisition, analysis, and appreciation of 
relevant data” (Betts, 1978, p. 35). Analysts must take whatever data they are given – 
whether it is too much data, poor data (that has gaps of information), or not enough data – 
and be able to produce a usable analysis that could potentially save the United States 
from an impending attack. Similarly, the more ambiguous data is, the more likely 
analysts are going to rely on their preconceptions about the situation or culture.  Betts 
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point out that uncertainty from analysts reflects inadequacy of data or lack of 
information. However, uncertainty can also come about because there is an excess of 
data. For example, in a war setting there is an overload of analyses, battlefield statistics, 
reports, bulletins, and communications intercepts at a rate too fast for analysts to fully 
analyze them in a short amount of time (Betts, 1978). 
 Information Warfare (IW) is defined by Johnson (2004) as a series of elements 
including: attack and defense capabilities and techniques, supporting intelligence 
collection for targeting information (locations, strengths, vulnerabilities, defenses), 
supporting intelligence collection for battle damage assessment, and supporting 
intelligence collection for attack indications and warning. Johnson describes the target of 
IW as the adversary’s decision process. It is reached through a “campaign that involves 
generation of effects on the adversary’s information that prevents or prompts certain 
actions, thereby creating an advantage for the attacker” (Johnson, 2004, p. 50). 
 There are multiple types of attacks that analysts seek to prevent through 
Intelligence warfare. These can be seen in Table 1. It also shows what kind of damage 
could be done if the attack is not prevented (Functional Effect). There are three different 
target types that could be attacked, as shown in Table 1: the information layer, which if 
attacked can create technical effects, the information-management layer, which if 
attacked causes functional effects, and the decision-process layer, which if attacked 
creates operational effects (Johnson, 2004).  
 
 
14 
 
Table 1: Johnsons (2004) chart explaining types of attacks prevented by Information Warfare 
shows the span of damage that can potentially be done through a failure in preventing attack. 
Type of Attack Target 
Layer 
Technical 
Effect 
Functional Effect Operational 
Effect 
Communication 
Jamming 
Information 
System 
Signal 
Blockage 
Information Loss Delayed or 
wrong decision 
Communications 
intrusion – short 
control message 
Information 
Management 
None  Information misrouting, 
self-generated overload 
(diagnostic, correction, 
repeat messages 
Delay, confusion 
Communications 
intrusion – short 
information 
message 
Decision 
Process 
None – link 
continues to 
exist 
Negligible – short message 
does not affect 
routing/handling/storage 
Delay, confusion, 
wrong decision 
Computer Virus Information 
System 
System 
Paralysis 
Loss of data, loss of 
function at node 
Delayed or 
wrong decision 
Network Worm Information 
Management 
None Delay or overload 
amounting to loss of 
function 
Delayed 
decisions; 
deliberate 
shutdown of 
unaffected nodes 
PSYOPS/ 
propaganda 
messages 
Decision 
Process 
None None Decision 
Influence 
Military operation 
as PSYOPS 
maneuver 
Decision 
Process 
None None Perception 
Manipulation 
 
 So, in order for intelligence agents to be able to perform all aspects of IW, they 
have many kinds of information that comes in to them. This information may or may not 
be useful or actually informative for the purpose of detecting any potential harmful 
occurrence to the United States. In the case of poor data taken in by intelligence 
military/operational agencies tends to be analyzed and assessed more optimistically 
compared to ambiguous data analyzed by nonoperational units/CIA which tends to be 
analyzed and assessed more pessimistically (Betts, 1978). 
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PHASES OF ANALYSIS 
Analyst work can be broken down into two types of phases: time-related phases 
and task-related phases. The first, time-related phases are shown in Table 2, and include 
real-time, near real-time, and forensic analysis. Paul (2013) mentions these phases in the 
detection of vehicles that might be a threat (Paul, 2013). These phases can be correlated 
to actions of an individual or group and detecting whether or not they might be a threat. 
MIB can show itself in any given phase, although is most prominent in the immediate or 
real-time decisions that have to be made without any time for analysis or thinking more 
in-depth about what the other individual or group might do in relation to their own 
culture or beliefs. Similarly, each of the phases in either one of the categories, time or 
task, have improper data. This data is not necessarily relevant data, so analysts could 
hypothetically have both ends of the spectrum: too much data to sort through as well as 
not enough relevant data. The difference between any of the given phases is the time 
available or the kind of task done to the data. 
Table 2: Time-related phases of analyst work have three phases: real-time, near real-time, and forensic. 
The Mirror Image Bias can appear in any of the phases, although it is most likely to happen in the real-
time phase. 
 Type of Analysis Supporting Information 
Phase 1 Real-Time Sensor data is used to detect immediate events 
Phase 2 Near Real-Time Groups or patterns are detected and analyzed with short delays 
Phase 3 Forensic 
Groups or patterns are detected and analyzed with a week or more 
delays 
 
The second group, task-related phases, are mentioned by the work of Goodall, 
Lutters, & Komlodi (2004). In the experiment, performed by analysts, all participants 
followed a similar three-phase process: monitoring, analysis, and response (Goodall, 
Lutters, & Komlodi, 2004). These phases are described in Table 3. Although the research 
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by Goodall et al. was done to analyze how analysts detect system intrusion, it can easily 
be correlated to how analysts would detect threats on a larger and more general scale. The 
first phase, monitoring, encompasses the daily “mundane” tasks of ongoing surveillance 
in order to look for “indications of anomalous or malicious activity” (Goodall et al., 
2004, p. 1423). In this stage, analysts must deal with information overload and have to 
find ways to reduce the data into a more manageable level by either scanning through it 
faster or by some other method. In the second phase, analysis is done. Goodall describes 
the transition from the first to the second phase as beginning with a “security trigger 
event” (Goodall et al., 2004, p. 1424). In this phase, analysts must determine whether the 
trigger is an actual threat, and if it is to determine how severe of a threat it is. In this 
phase it is important for the analyst to have knowledge of the environment so they can 
easily determine severity of a threat. For example, what seems like normal activity in one 
environment may be indicative of illicit activity in another (Goodall et al., 2004). In the 
third and final phase, response, a final assessment must be done and a decision be made 
on what to do. The most common responses come in the form of intervention, feedback, 
and reporting (Goodall et al., 2004). 
Table 3: Task-related phases of analyst work are broken down into: monitoring, analysis, and response. 
The Mirror Imaging Bias can appear in any of the phases, although it is most likely to happen in the phases 
that require analysts to make decisions quickly. 
 Type of Analysis Supporting Information 
Phase 1 Monitoring Ongoing surveillance, mundane daily tasks, information overload 
Phase 2 Analysis Assessment of trigger events and severity, important for analyst to 
have extensive knowledge of environment 
Phase 3 Response Intervention, feedback, reporting 
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 As with the first set of phases, MIB can show itself in any of the given task-
related phases. It is important to understand when MIB appears and how to take steps to 
resolve the problems it elicits.  
LACK OF TRAINING AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE CULTURE 
 The second possibility why analysts have failures has to do with a combination of 
not having sufficient training and knowledge of the culture with which they are dealing. 
More failures of intelligence have come about in the stages of interpretation and response 
of data (Betts, 1978). In other words, analysts who are tasked to analyze and interpret 
data are likely to fail by assuming something falsely from the facts. Knowing the culture 
with which you are dealing is extremely important, not only in a general sense, but also in 
terms of MIB. Pipes, in his paper “What to do About the CIA,” explains that analysts 
should be required to have a profound knowledge of the societies they deal with in order 
to avoid MIB. If they do this, they will slowly learn to avoid the American viewpoint and 
understand that not all cultures are the same (Pipes, 1995). 
 This lack of training creates an issue because the insufficient training rests upon a 
very strong tendency of a specific culture thinking that all other cultures behave and 
make decisions like their own culture. People are, understandably, drawn to thinking like 
their own culture. Americans tend to have a false understanding that is embedded within 
themselves that “fundamentally all peoples are the same – that is, like white, middle-class 
Americans – and if given a chance will behave like white, middle-class Americans” 
(Pipes, 1995). Of course, this doesn’t hold true for everyone. There are some individuals 
who are born with a natural understanding that not everyone will think and act as the 
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individual would if faced with the same situation – this trait is ideally what one looks for 
in an analyst. Some of this understanding can be taught, but it must be ingrained into a 
person for it to become effective. 
 Those that are either taught or have the natural skill to know that not all decisions 
are made alike between cultures are more likely to have successes in analyzing the data 
and situations they are given. Arthur Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force 
Transformation brought forth the point that “knowledge of one’s own enemy and his 
culture and society may be more important than knowledge of his order of battle” 
(McFate, 2005). Many times analysts are faced with data that seems to lay out the “order 
of battle”, or their potential plans to harm a countries people, but it is dismissed because 
the analysts don’t know why they would do those things – they don’t have an 
understanding of the culture. However, when versed in the culture itself it makes much 
more sense and they are able to better detect why and what the adversary will do in the 
future. One example of a success because of knowledge of the culture comes from Sir 
Robert Vansittart. In the 1930’s he provided an “accurate assessment of Nazi capabilities 
and intentions, including the likelihood of Germany’s rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union. He succeeded because he knew Germany better than the professionals of the 
Secret Service” (Pipes, 1995). Another example is in Joseph G. Grew, who had spent an 
extensive time in Tokyo, Japan as an American ambassador. He responded to judgments 
that the Japanese could not contemplate an attack on the US by warning against “any 
possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict 
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with the US. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity 
cannot be measured by our own standards of logic” (Pipes, 1995). 
 To bring this section to a conclusion, another quote by Pipes summarizes the need 
for training and knowledge of the culture with which the analyst is dealing:  
“The more imaginative the analyst and the better versed in the cultures 
with which he deals, the less likely he will be to attribute to others his own 
values and objectives” (Pipes, 1995). 
COGNITIVE BIASES 
 The third potential reason why analysts experience failures has to do with 
cognitive biases. It is suggested by Levin (1988) that there are two standpoints that a 
person can take: the “assertoric” gaze and the “aletheic” gaze. If a person takes the 
assertoric gaze, they only see things from one perspective, one standpoint, or one position 
and therefore tend to be “narrow-minded, dogmatic, inflexible, and unmoved” (Schaller, 
2008). If a person takes the aletheic gaze they are more inclusive and therefore tend to be 
more “caring, interdependent, and reciprocal” (Schaller, 2008). In the assertoric gaze, the 
perspective taken is typically that of one-self – which is the basis for many cognitive 
biases. Cognitive biases are flaws in judgments which occur in particular situations as a 
result of flawed perception of incoming information. These biases are particularly 
prevalent when decision makers have to weigh evidence from many different sources 
(Davidow & Levinson, 1993) or face data that is scarce, ambiguous or of low quality 
(Tverseky & Kahneman, 1974). Cognitive biases result in reduced objectivity in selection 
decisions (Proenca & de Oliveira, 2009), causing decision makers to: 
 
20 
 
 Be too quick to make a decision and ignore contrary evidence 
 Be overly zealous in justifying personal decisions 
 Selectively search for evidence that will support past judgment rather than 
objectively evaluating all information 
 
 Biases are a way for humans to simplify a complex social world; humans rely on 
these heuristics to allow for more efficient information processing, memory, and retrieval 
of complicated stimuli humans are faced with on a day-to-day basis (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991). If humans considered every single option in any given situation in a day they 
would be completely overloaded mentally. Therefore, they succumb to the biases, for the 
most part, without even knowing what they are doing. Typically, as proposed by Pipes 
(1995), if reality clashes with a person’s wishes, the wishes usually win out (Pipes, 1995). 
Cognitive biases are practically impossible for humans to completely avoid altogether. 
However, with proper training and understanding, it is possible to understand when an 
individual experiences these biases – and then understand how to take steps to alleviate 
the experienced bias. 
 There are countless types of cognitive biases that have been explored in literature, 
in businesses, and in the analyst world. Several of these are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4: A small selection of the types of Cognitive Biases related to the Mirror Image Bias. 
 
 Two biases that are centered on different cultures and beliefs include 
Ethnocentrism and the Mirror Imaging Bias. Ethnocentrism is one bias that analysts 
might experience. From a sociological viewpoint, Ethnocentrism is a tendency to view 
alien groups or cultures from the perspective of one’s own (Ethnocentrism, n.d.). This 
type of bias is especially dangerous on a national-security context because it can distort 
strategic thinking and result in assumptions that the adversary will behave exactly as one 
Bias Definition 
Contrast Bias Involves making an evaluation based on the standard of the preceding information.  
(Petty & Wegener, 1993; Perrin, Barnett & Walrath, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Shapiro 
& Spence, 2005) 
Anchoring and 
Adjustment Bias 
Results from decision makers over-relying on a pre-existing anchor, or initial 
estimation when making evaluations.  (Perrin, Barnett & Walrath, 1993; Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz & 
Bergus, 2007) 
Order Effects – 
Primacy and 
Recency Effect 
Primacy effect - when information first presented to the person influences the final 
judgment more than information presented later during the session. Recency effect - 
information presented later in the session has a greater influence on the final 
decision made.  (Morgeson & Campion, 2010; Peggy, Wegener & Fabrigar, 1997; 
Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Krosnick & Alwin, 1987) 
Availability Bias Results from inaccurately basing the frequency of events on the ease with which 
they can be recalled to memory (Morgeson & Campion, 2010; Perrin, Barnett & Walrath, 
1993; Dube-Rioux & Russo, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) 
Confirmation Bias The tendency to seek evidence to confirm an initial preconception and ignore any 
contradictory information.  (Dror & Fraser- McKenzie, 2008; Perrin, Barnett & Walrath, 
1993; Nickerson, 1998; Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney, 1977) 
Representativeness 
Bias 
The tendency of people to judge the degree of relationship between two things based 
on their similarity to each other. Also might inadvertently result in stereotyping. 
(Morgeson & Campion, 2010; Perrin, Barnett & Walrath, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). 
Attentional Bias When someone focuses on one or two choices despite there being other possible 
outcomes. (Mather & Carstensen, 2003; Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002; Mogg, Bradley & 
Williams, 1995; MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986) 
Belief Bias A bias where people make faulty conclusions based on what they already believe or 
know. (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Klauer, Musch & Naumer, 2000; Sá, West & 
Stanovich, 1999; Markovits & Nantel, 1989) 
Conservatism Bias Where people believe prior evidence more than new evidence or info that has 
emerged. (Redlawsk, Civettini & Lau, 2007; Huq, Garety, Hemsley, 1988) 
Empathy Gap Where people in one state fail to understand people in another state. (Sayette, 
Loewenstein, Griffin, Black, 2008; Lowenstein, 2005; Read, Van Leeuwen, 1998;  Van 
Boven, Dunning, Loewenstein, 2000) 
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might behave (McFate, 2005). Another cognitive bias that analysts experience is the 
Mirror Imaging Bias. It is without a doubt the most common error of intelligence-
estimating (Pipes, 1995) and frequently results in gross distortions of intelligence and raw 
data (Witlin, 2008). Analysts essentially fit the data into a “box” to which it is not suited. 
One of the prominent issues that come from the MIB is that it increases analysts’ 
susceptibility to surprise attacks by adversaries. This is clearly something that needs to be 
fixed to be able to minimize the risk to the country. 
 Fortunately, there are ways to counteract the cognitive biases. “The intelligence 
community is aware of the dangers of mirror-imaging. The most effective way to combat 
mirror-imaging is supplementing an analyst’s personal experiences… the more training 
and experience that can be given to these individuals the less likely they will be to 
substitute their own cultural values and perceptions when they encounter informational 
gaps” (Witlin, 2008). 
MIRROR IMAGING BIAS 
 The Mirror Imaging Bias, as pointed out earlier, is the most common bias 
experienced by intelligence analysts. It is an analyst’s irrational assumption that the 
people being studied think and act like the analyst themselves and [the analysts] are 
unable to consider variants in the opposing country and culture because they are viewing 
the information through the filter of personal experience. Another definition by Richard 
Pipes in his paper What to do About the CIA explains the MIB as “the tendency to 
interpret the actions of others in one’s own terms. The analyst looks at the situation which 
his subject confronts and asks himself: “What would I do if I were in his shoes?” The 
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propensity to think in this way derives from a mixture of deficient imagination and, 
where other nations are concerned, ethnocentricity” (Pipes, 1995). 
 This cognitive bias is dangerous. If in a serious enough situation, where lives are 
potentially in danger – as they were in 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, or other examples that were 
listed above – the MIB can prove to be fatal. When the analyst says to themselves “What 
would I do if I were in his shoes,” they put their own perspectives and background rather 
than taking into consideration the perspectives and background of the adversary. This in 
turn undermines objectivity (Witlin, 2008). A warning from Frank Wantabe states that 
“simply because something is logical doesn’t mean that the subject being analyzed will 
see it that way” (Witlin, 2008). When differences in thought processes and beliefs are 
taken into consideration, it almost seems obvious that the analyzers viewpoint is not the 
same as that of the person being analyzed. 
 Within literature, there are many viewpoints on why the MIB occurs within 
analysts. While the MIDAS group believes it is a standalone cognitive bias, there are still 
others that think that it comes along with other biases. These pairings can be broken 
down into three sections: the failure of Theory of Mind, a racial bias, and mindreading. 
FIRST POTENTIAL CAUSE OF MIB: FAILURE OF THEORY OF MIND 
 The Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states – beliefs, 
intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. – to oneself and others and to understand that 
others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one's own (Call & 
Tomasello, 2008). ToM expresses itself in the TPJ (temporal parietal junction), which is 
important in making the distinction between self and other. For example it allows a 
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person to be able to answer the question: Did I generate this action or did I merely 
observe the action of the other? (van der Meer, Groenwold, Nolen, Pijnenbork, Aleman, 
2011). Figure 1 shows the distinction between MIB and ToM. 
 
Figure 1: MIB is when you predict what you would do when analyzing and predicting another persons’ 
behavior whereas ToM is when you predict what the other person would do. 
 Research has shown that young subjects, in comparison with adults, are less 
capable to perform ToM tasks (van der Meer et al., 2011). Before their brain is 
completely developed and before they are concerned with other people, and even other 
cultures, they are unable to understand the difference between their beliefs and others’ 
beliefs. Development of ToM is between the ages of 3 and 5 (Nickerson, 1999). Another 
study by Tamm, Menon, & Reiss (2002) investigated brain maturation in relation to 
response inhibition. The results showed a positive correlation between activation in the 
left Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) and age. This showed that younger subjects were not as 
good at ToM tasks (Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002; van der Meer et al., 2011). 
 As with many other cognitive biases, ToM entails more than one step. Van der 
Meer has explained that the Theory of Mind, in two parts, involves 1) inhibition of one’s 
own perspective, which leads into 2) belief reasoning. The first, inhibition of one’s own 
Attempt to predict another's behavior
You predict what 
YOU would do
MIB
You predict what 
THEY would do
ToM
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perspective, may well be a necessary feature of perspective taking according to van der 
Meer (van der Meer et al., 2011).  
 The first part of Theory of Mind, inhibition of one’s own perspective, is known by 
several different names: empathic accuracy and knowledge imputation. Empathic 
accuracy is a person’s ability to accurately infer the specific content of another person’s 
thoughts and feelings (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, Teng, 1995). “Empathically accurate 
perceivers are those who are consistently good at “reading” other people’s thoughts and 
feelings. All else being equal they are likely to be the most tactful advisors, the most 
diplomatic officials, the most effective negotiators, the most electable politicians, the 
most productive salespersons, the most successful teachers, and the most insightful 
therapists” (Nickerson, 1999). Imputation is a noun that is the act of imputing – saying or 
suggesting that someone or something has or is guilty of something - as an attribution, 
accusation, and insinuation (imputation, n.d.). Knowledge imputation, therefore, is the 
attribution, accusation or insinuation that someone has knowledge of something, whether 
or not they actually do in reality. “It seems clear that the imputation of knowledge to 
others may be done with different degrees of awareness. One may impute some 
knowledge (e.g., the knowledge that Wednesday follows Tuesday,) automatically without 
being conscious of doing so; in other cases, one may impute knowledge as a consequence 
of a thought process of which one is very much aware (e.g., “She undoubtedly knows of 
who wrote Middlemarch, because she is very interested in the English Literature”)” 
(Nickerson, 1999). 
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One term for the failure of inhibition, which in turn can help us understand the 
success of inhibition, is called Egocentrism. According to Jean Piaget, egocentrism is an 
inability on the part of a child in the preoperational stage of development to see any point 
of view other than their own (“Egocentrism,” n.d.). This concept doesn’t necessarily have 
to only pertain to children – it can be extended to all others who have a failure to 
understand beyond their own point of view. In children, egocentrism isn’t shown in more 
errors of social judgment. Instead it shows itself in the fact that they make one particular 
kind of error: attributing their own knowledge, viewpoint, feelings, etc to others (Shantz, 
1983; Nickerson, 1999). Egocentrism is when people don’t set aside their own 
perspective when adopting another’s but instead use [their own perspective] as a starting 
point, or judgmental anchor (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004). This 
‘egocentric assumption’ was first suggested by Fenigstein and Abrams (1993). 
Individuals whose heads are tilted will judge straight lines as tilted if they are 
simultaneously distracted but will recognize the biasing influence of their tilted head and 
identify the line as straight if they are not distracted (Epley et al., 2004). In the absence of 
compelling, identifiable reasons for some other assumption, the best default assumption 
one can make regarding another’s knowledge on a particular subject is arguably one’s 
own knowledge of that subject (Nickerson, 1999). These misapprehensions potentially 
are grounded in a tendency to impute one’s own perspective to others (Ruby & Decety, 
2003). To fix this tendency, a dimension of cognitive flexibility must be added in order to 
assess others’ states of mind accurately (Ruby & Decety, 2003). 
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 The second part of Theory of Mind, belief reasoning, is the reasoning about 
mental states like beliefs, desires and intentions in an attempt to explain, predict, and 
manipulate human behavior (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, Samson, 2006). Saxe 
et al. (2004) suggests that belief reasoning must meet two criteria: generality and 
specificity.  He points out that “First, the candidate region must show increased activity 
to any stimuli that invite the attribution of beliefs, both true and false. Second, the 
response must be specific to belief attribution” (Saxe, Carey, Kanwisher, 2004). Belief 
reasoning is an everyday behavior that is argued to be automatic (Friedman & Leslie, 
2004; Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). “It is unknown 
whether [the belief reasoning] is made automatically when people attend to the behavior 
of agents, or whether such inferences are made ad hoc, according to need” (Apperly, 
Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, Samson, 2006). As with many of the other cognitive biases, 
belief reasoning – considering other peoples beliefs and desires – is a way to simplify a 
situation that might otherwise be difficult to understand. 
 The typical formats for tests on belief reasoning in humans are described as 
follows. These can be seen in action through experiments by Sommer et al. (2007), Birch 
and Bloom (2007), and van der Meer (2011). There are a series of images or videos that 
show a “story” of what is going on in a room. Specifically in the experiment by Sommer 
et al. (2007) the first set of pictures show a girl and a boy in a room with two boxes. The 
girl takes a toy that is lying on the floor and places it in container #2 and then leaves the 
room. There are two separate cases: true belief, and false belief. In the true belief case, 
the boy takes the toy out of container #2 and is holding it when the girl re-enters the 
 
28 
 
room. He then places it in container #1 while the girl is watching. In the false belief case, 
the boy takes the toy out of container #2 and places it in container #1 while the girl is out 
of the room. The girl then re-enters the room. A question is then asked as to where the 
girl thinks the toy is. In the true belief case, the expected response is that the girl will 
think the toy is in container #1 because the girl saw the boy switch the toys location in 
front of her. Therefore the unexpected (false) response would be the girl thinking the toy 
is in container #2 even though the toy, in reality, is in container #1. In the false belief 
case, after being asked the same question, the expected response is that the girl will think 
the toy is still in container #2 because she didn’t see the boy switch the toys location. The 
unexpected (false) response is that the girl the girl thinks the toy is in container #1 even 
though she didn’t see the boy switch the toys location. 
 These sorts of experiments are normally only done with the false belief case, but 
Sommer et al. chose to consider the other side in the true belief case. Similarly, these 
belief reasoning experiments have been run with both adults and children. Adults seem to 
be able to use belief reasoning in their everyday lives easily. However, children have a 
more difficult time understanding complex mental states. The cutoff, as suggested by 
Kovács (2009) is around the age of 4. Before then, children are normally unable to 
understand any viewpoints besides their own (Kovács, 2009). “Younger children fail on 
ToM tasks because they cannot reason about complex mental states, such as beliefs 
(Perner, 1991 via Kovács, 2009). If so, successful performance on false-belief tasks 
reflects the emergence of an understanding of others (and oneself) in terms of mental 
conditions” (Kovács, 2009). Responses from experiments show whether the participant is 
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capable of belief reasoning – if they follow the expected response – or not – if they 
follow the unexpected response.  
SECOND POTENTIAL CAUSE OF MIB: CULTURAL BIAS 
“Most of our misunderstandings of other people are not due to any 
inability to hear them or to parse their sentences or to understand their 
words ...A far more important source of difficulty in communication is that 
we so often fail to understand a speaker's intention.”(Miller, 1974, as 
found in Thomas, 1983, p. 91) 
 The second potential cause of the Mirror Imaging Bias is due to a cultural bias in 
the person. It is clear that each culture, and even further - each person, has different 
beliefs and experiences. “When, in daily human interactions, persons have reflected back 
to them not themselves but the cultural assumptions of others, they experience a failed 
mirroring. Thus, failed mirroring is not merely an interpersonal interaction; it is a cultural 
phenomenon when societal representations are assumed and projected” (Schaller, 2008).  
Further, the mindset of the analyst tends to take over when hard evidence runs out 
(Heuer, 1999). This fact indicates that American analysts tend to project “American 
values and conceptual frameworks onto the foreign leaders and societies, rather than 
understanding the logic of the situation” (Heuer, 1999, p. 12). This cultural bias – 
thinking that “everybody thinks like us” – is completely falsified. People in other cultures 
do not think the same way that we do. 
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THIRD POTENTIAL CAUSE OF MIB: MINDREADING 
 The third potential cause of the Mirror Imaging Bias is through a cognitive action 
known as Mindreading. This action is the activity of representing specific mental states of 
others, for example, their perceptions, goals, beliefs, expectations, and the like (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). There are two predominant approaches when researching this subject: 
theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). The TT explains that ordinary people 
accomplish mindreading by acquiring and deploying commonsense theory of mind, 
something akin to a scientific theory (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). ST suggests that 
attributors use their own mental mechanisms to calculate and predict the mental processes 
of others (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). The core difference between TT and ST, 
according to Gallese and Goldman (1998), is that TT depicts mindreading as thoroughly 
‘detached’ theoretical activity, whereas ST depicts mindreading as incorporating an 
attempt to replicate, mimic, or impersonate the mental life of the target agent (Gallese 
and Goldman, 1998). 
 Baron-Cohen (1995) explains mindreading as the “cognitive ability to represent 
the psychological states (perceptions, emotions, intentions, desires, beliefs, etc.) of 
oneself and others” (Jacob, 2008). If the consideration of self is included in mindreading, 
it is possible to think that another person would act as you would - which would be a 
representation of the Mirror Imaging Bias - rather than just taking into consideration what 
the other person would do in reality.  Mindreading, therefore, is “essentially a motor 
phenomenon of action synchronization, not inference” (Pineda, 2009). In the brain, 
 
31 
 
Mindreading activates areas such as the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal 
junction. (Pineda, 2009)  
Mindreading not only pulls from the ability to represent feelings or emotions to 
another, it also deals with the cognition of sentences or passages of information. 
Depending on how they are viewed or presented can completely change the context and 
therefore perception of the information. This concept pulls in many of the related 
cognitive biases previously mentioned that deal with the perception of facts and 
knowledge. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration how a person would look 
at the knowledge and how they might present it in different situations. 
  
 
32 
 
 
RESEARCH COMPONENTS 
Hofstede’s country classification scale was used to decide which cultures to use in 
the stimuli for the experiment. “Hofstede's (1980) study is one of the most frequently 
cited research efforts regarding the relationship between national culture and work-
related values (Bhagat & McQuaid, 1982 via Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, & Nicholson, 
1997). His research has been instrumental in furthering an understanding of cross-cultural 
management theory and practice, revealing that members of different societies hold 
divergent values concerning the nature of organizations and interpersonal relationships 
within them” (Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, & Nicholson, 1997). Hofstede’s cultural 
contrasts have standard scores for each culture. These scores were used in order to choose 
which cultures to include in the testing stimuli. Those with scores the most different from 
U.S. were considered to be different enough from our cultures viewpoint to be able to test 
for a significant difference in opinion on these dimensions: Individualism vs. 
Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity vs. Femininity, and Power Distance. 
Table 5 shows some standard scores found by Hofstede and used in our study.  
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Table 5: Cultural Contrast Standard Scores (Fernandez et al., 1997). Those with a significant difference 
from U.S. scores were countries and contrasts that were included in our experiment. 
Individualism vs. Collectivism 
U.S. 1.52 
Russia -1.89 
China -0.96 
Japan -0.53 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
U.S. 0.59 
Mexico -1.2 
Germany -1.16 
Japan -0.81 
Masculinity vs. Femininity 
U.S. -0.58 
China 2.2 
Mexico 0.62 
Japan 0.42 
Power Distance 
U.S. -0.01 
 
 Each image used in the experiment was tested through the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS) rating scale to ensure consistency. The IAPS was “developed to 
provide a set of normative emotional stimuli for experimental investigators of emotion 
and attention … The existence of these collections of normatively rated affective stimuli 
should: 1) allow better experimental control in the selection of emotional stimuli, 2) 
facilitate the comparison of results across different studies conducted in the same or 
different laboratory, and 3) encourage and allow exact replications within and across 
research labs who are assembling basic and applied problems in psychological science” 
(Lang, Bradley, Cuthbert, 1999). Although their images were not used, the scale was used 
to make certain that the images were all of the same approximate rating – this ensured 
that no images were statistically any different than the others. 
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VISUAL MEASURES 
In terms of the visual measures, this section will be broken down further into the 
different types that will be collected as well as how they could potentially relate to the 
cognitive workload of the human. Each of these measures will be collected and analyzed 
through the Tobii eye tracking system.  
FIXATIONS AND SACCADES 
Fixations, or a fixation point, is “the point in the visual field that is fixated by the 
two eyes in normal vision and for each eye is the point that directly stimulates the fovea 
of the retina” (fixation point, n.d.). In other words it is a point in which both eyes focus 
for a certain period of time. On the other hand, a saccade is a “small rapid jerky 
movement of the eye especially as it jumps from fixation on one point to another” 
(saccade, n.d.). 
Liversedge and Findlay (2000) researched the use of saccades in visual search and 
reading to see if it could be related to cognitive processes. Although they didn’t come to a 
specific conclusion on a direct correlation, they did note the importance of fixations in 
understanding cognitive processes. They argued that “deciding where and when to move 
the point of fixation are key aspects of eye-movement control and that understanding the 
relationship between the two is necessary to understand fully the cognitive processes 
reflected by eye movements” (Liversedge & Findlay, 2000, p. 12). A study by Loftus and 
Mackworth (1978) on visual search patterns in a picture, found that the fact that 
“observers fixate earlier, more often, and with longer durations on objects that have a low 
probability of appearing in a scene” implies that cognitive factors play a role in peripheral 
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visual processing (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978, p. 565). Another study by Just and 
Carpenter (1978) looked at visual patterns of rotation detection and found that as the 
tasks became harder, and therefore more cognitively involved, that people gaze at the 
figures for much longer (Just & Carpenter, 1978). 
BLINK RATE AND PUPIL DIAMETER 
Blink rate is the number of times per minute that a person closes their eyes and 
the pupil diameter is the length of the pupil from side to side. A study by Bentivoglio, 
Bressman, Cassetta, Carretta, Tonali, & Albanese (1997) looked at blink rate in relation 
to a reading task that required mental and visual concentration. They found that blink rate 
decreased during reading and increased during conversation. In a study by Siegle, 
Ichikawa, and Steinhauer that crosses over the concepts of both blink rate and pupil 
diameter in relation to information processing, found that blinks flank periods of change 
in cognitive load as well as that there were a burst of blinks peaking before the pupillary 
response (Siegle, Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008). Again, this study showed that as the 
peak pupil dilation is delayed from neural and muscular activity, blinks may precede 
cognitive load. Similarly, they found that “sustained cognitive load was accompanied by 
sustained pupil dilation but not sustained blinks” (Siegle et al. 2008, p. 684).  
GAZE PATTERNS AND HEAT MAPS 
Gaze patterns are the paths that a persons’ eye travels while viewing a picture or 
scene in their visual path. Heat maps are a way to analyze how frequently a person looks 
at a certain area in comparison to other areas. Henderson, in a research article on gaze 
control, points out that eye movement is “smart” because it not only draws on currently 
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available visual information, but also on several cognitive systems like short term 
memory, long term visual, special and semantic information, and also goals and plans of 
the viewer (Henderson, 2003). Although there is very little research done on how these 
factors can correlate to cognitive activities, it is extremely interesting to see what in a 
particular picture draws a persons’ attention. An example of a heat map on an image can 
be seen in Figure 2. Areas of the heat map that are red are frequented more often than 
areas with no color at all. 
 
Figure 2: An example of a heat map when a participant views a picture shows that several areas of the 
picture attract more attention than others. 
PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES 
The term cognitive load is used to refer to the load that performing a particular 
task imposes on the person’s cognitive system (Paas et al., 1994; found in Nourbakhsh, 
2012). It has extremely profound impacts on many aspects of human life including, but 
not limited to: learning (Sweller, 1994), safety in driving (Engstrom, Johansson, & 
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Östlund, 2005), aviation (Huttunen, Keränen, Väyrynen, Pääkkönen, & Leino, 2011; 
Wilson, 2002), and user interface design (Saadé & Otrakji, 2007). Cognitive overload 
often leads to performance reduction and errors that in some cases such as air traffic 
control can have serious consequences (Nourbakhsh, 2012). Five forms of physiological 
measures were collected from participants during the experiment: galvanic skin response 
(GSR), heart rate variance (HRV), respiration, skin temperature, electromyography 
(EMG(F)) of the medial frontalis, and right-unilateral EMG(E) of the orbicularis oculi. 
Each of these will be outlined and related to cognitive workload in this section. 
GALVANIC SKIN RESPONSE (GSR) 
Many studies have explored the relationship between the Galvanic Skin Response 
(GSR) and cognitive load. GSR data is collected by attaching one or two sensors to the 
skin of the subject, typically to the index and middle finger pads, and is measured in 
micro Siemens. In the MIDAS Tobii study, two CAPTIV GSR sensors are attached to the 
middle and index finger pads to measure the electrical conductance of the skin. 
Many studies have looked into GSR and what it means for cognitive load. Landis 
and Hunt (as found in Mundy-Castle, 1953) concluded that it may indicate change of 
direction of mental activity, but not a direct measure. Another study by van der Merwe 
and Theron (1947) to study the “value of the Groetz finger plethsymograph in measuring 
emotional stability” found a positive correlation between rates of change in finger pulse 
volume [which is an early measurement of GSR] and emotional liability; which supports 
the claim that GSR is associated with emotion (Van der Merwe, Theron, 1947, p. 109). 
Mundy-Castle and McKiever didn’t find any significant correlation between 
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psychophysiological data and GSR in a study with harsh-audio stimuli to see if 
“individual differences in GSR adaptation rate are related to a temperamental factor 
underlying differences in excitatory/inhibitory balance”, they did find that there was 
significance between age and GSR (Mundy-Castle and McKiever, 1953, p. 16). 
“The association between GSR groups and age immediately suggests that 
stability may be a function of maturity; there is increasing evidence to 
show that there are centers for autonomic control in the frontal cortex” 
(Mundy-Castle, McKiever, 1953, p. 22). 
Another study by Tarankar et.al (2013) showed that GSR and respiratory 
responses are relatable and correlated to each other. (Turankar et al., 2011). Nourbakhsh, 
Want, Chen, & Calvo (2012) found that there was a correlation between GSR and 
cognitive load measurement in a study on text reading tasks and arithmetic tasks. 
Nourbakhsh, Wang & Chen (2013) furthered their previous study to see if there was any 
correlation between blink rate, GSR, and cognitive load. They found that both are good 
detectors of how mentally involved people are. The higher the GSR frequency, the more 
mentally involved a subject is as well as the lower a persons’ blink rate, the more 
mentally involved they are. What’s more, the combination of blink number and GSR 
frequency power resulted in the highest classification accuracies (Nourbakhsh, Want, 
Chen, 2013). However, they did mention that since there are differences from person to 
person, the GSR rating must be calibrated. They used the following equation:  
𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗)
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑚𝑗=1
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Where m is the number of tasks. This equation essentially normalizes the data by 
dividing each individual data-point by the mean rating of the entire study. Shi, Ruiz, 
Taib, Choi, & Chen (2007) did a similar study to look at the correlation of GSR to stress 
level and found that as a person becomes more or less stressed, the GSR increases or 
decreases respectively (Shi, Ruiz, Taib, Choi, Chen, 2007). They analyzed their data by 
using a mean GSR value for each stimuli and followed up with an ANOVA test to see if 
there was a correlation. As the difficulty of the task increased, the GSR value increased. 
Conway, Dick, Wang, & Chen (2013) used a similar method to normalize the GSR 
values in order to analyze the mean ratings for their stimuli set (Conway, Dick, Wang, & 
Chen, 2013). For the purposes of this study, a normalized mean GSR value for each 
stimuli was used to compare between participants.  
HEART RATE VARIANCE (HRV) 
Heart rate, measured in beats per minute, is the rate at which the heart beats. 
Using the CAPTIV system, the heart rate is measured by a thoracic belt. Heart rate 
variability (HRV), therefore, measures the interplay between sympathetic and 
parasympathetic influences on heart rate (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006).  
Heart rate, in a study on driving mannerisms by Mehler, Reimer, Coughlin, & 
Dusek (2009) showed that average heart rate increased as cognitive task demands 
increased (Mehler, Reimer, Coughlin & Dusek, 2009). In a study by Hansen, Johnsen, & 
Thayer (2009) to see if there was a correlation between HRV and anxiety, stress, & 
coping found that there was a correlation between high HRV and good performance on 
cognitive function tasks (Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009). A study by Huysamen, 
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Göbel, & Davy (1998) completed a study to compare HRV to different cognitive tasks, 
the complexity of those tasks, as well as the time of day the task was completed. It was 
found that memory tasks showed the highest HRV values and heart rate frequency values 
(Huysamen, Göbel, & Davy, 2013).  
While this information is useful, the HRV data collected was unreliable, so this 
relation will not be explored in analysis. 
RESPIRATION 
Respiration, through the CAPTIV system is measured as a percentage of how 
much a person has inhaled or exhaled. Respiration rate, however, is the rate at which a 
person inhales or exhales; essentially breaths per minute. In the study, previously 
mentioned, by Mehler et al (2009) it showed that as cognitive task demands increased, 
respiration rate also increased (Mehler et al., 2009). Another study by Novak, Mihelj, & 
Munih (2011) explained that mean respiration rate decreases as cognitive workload 
increases, but increases again as the challenge becomes too much to handle (Novak, 
Mihelj, & Munih, 2011, p. 7). Due to technical restraints in analysis, this measurement 
will not be explored for the purposes of this project.  
SKIN TEMPERATURE 
Temperature is what it sounds like: the outside temperature of a human. It is 
typically gathered by placing a thermometer sensor on the wrist on top of one of the main 
blood carrying veins. Through CAPTIV, it is measured in degrees Celsius, which can be 
easily transferred over to degrees Fahrenheit if needed. In the previously mentioned study 
by Novak et al. (2011) they found that temperature might be a good indicator of when a 
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subject is overworked (Novak et al., 2011). Another study by Or and Duffy (2007) 
looked into skin temperature in a driving simulator in order to detect a change in mental 
workload. They found that there was a relation of temperature drop to an increase of 
mental workload (Or & Duffy, 2007). 
As with the HRV, while this information is useful, the temperature data collected 
was unreliable, so this relation will also not be explored in analysis. All methods not 
measured in this project will be explored in the future. 
ELECTROMYOGRAPHY (EMG) 
Electromyography (EEG/EMG) is collected through sensors placed on the skin 
surface; specifically they will be placed on the right temporal area as well as the forehead 
and is measured with microvolts. They measure the electrical activity of muscles at rest 
and during contraction. It has been found that increases in slow-wave EEG have been 
associated with decreased alertness (Wright & McGown, 2001). A study by Wilson, 
Caldwell, and Russell (2007) found that “with regard to physiological correlates of task 
performance, the EEG and heart-rate measures collected during the experiment were 
highly correlated with the performance effects” (Wilson, Caldwell, & Russell, 2007). 
Therefore, average EMG can be used to quantify muscle activity over time.  
Root mean square is a method recommended quantification by Basmajian and 
DeLuca (1985) and is calculated by squaring each data point, summing the squares, 
dividing the sum by the number of observations, and then taking the square root. This 
number represents 0.707 of one half of the peak to peak value (Basmajian & De Luca, 
1985). However, average EMG can also be used as a quantification of the muscle activity 
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over time. A comparison of one participants data using both Root Mean Square and 
Average of the EMG data-points show that each essentially show the same thing, at a 
different ratio. The EMG of the medial frontalis can be seen in Figure 3 and shows the 
same trend (r2 = 0.9688). The right-unilateral EMG(E) of the orbicularis oculi 
comparison between RMS and Average EMG can be seen in Figure 4 shows the same 
trend (r2 = 0.9688). Based on these comparisons, the average of the EMG will be used for 
analysis. 
 
Figure 3: Comparison shows that AVG EMG on the forehead shows the same trend (r2 = 0.9688) as RMS 
data, simply at a different ratio. 
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Figure 4: Comparison shows that AVG EMG on the temple shows the same trend (r^2 = 0.9586) as RMS 
data, simply at a different ratio. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 Two outside factors were taken into consideration in our experiment: 
individualism and cultural differences. Individualism, or the fact that each person has 
their own distinct existence – their own beliefs, experiences, and personalities, was 
accounted for through pre and post questionnaires. These can be seen in Appendix A and 
B, respectively. If individuality was not accounted for, the test would have assumed that 
each participant was of the same viewpoint, experiences, beliefs, and personalities. This 
assumption would have been completely irrational and non-realistic because, as pointed 
out earlier, each person has their own individualities. Each tiny difference could 
potentially be a reason why they would exhibit the MIB. Cultural considerations were 
also accounted for. As with the last factor, if these were not included the experiment 
would have been non-realistic. Each culture has a set of their own beliefs and experiences 
that, theoretically, every person that is a part of the culture adheres to. Similarly, each 
culture has a set of stereotypes and biases that are assumed by other cultures (for 
example, All Americans are wasteful, or all Chinese children are great at math) whether 
or not they are actually correct. Through a partial knowledge of other cultures, people 
assume that they can understand and think like the other cultures. To analyze these 
cultural differences in the data, we asked questions about each person’s viewpoint to their 
own culture as well as their thoughts about other cultures in the pre and post 
questionnaire (ex. In the images, did the persons’ race play a role in your answers?) 
 
45 
 
 The first task in building the experimental stimuli was selecting what cultures to 
present.  It was decided to use China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and Russia. As presented 
earlier, Hofstede’s country classification scale was used as a reference point of standard 
scores for other cultures. From these standard scores, the topics were chosen for the 
stimuli. Power distance was excluded because the U.S. scores fall on the mean. The 
breakdown of topics can be seen in Figure 5. The individual topics are broken down into 
the three categories taken from Hofstede’s scores – each of them fitting within the higher 
topic (i.e. letting others share falls under individualism vs. collectivism because some 
cultures are more focused around sharing/collectivism while others prefer to not 
share/individualism). 
 
Figure 5: Hofstede's country classification aided in deciding topics for the experiments stimuli. Each of the 
three topics were broken down into five sub-topics. 
 Each sub-topic was explored with four different stimuli, totaling 60 images. 
Participants were exposed to each culturally relevant image with an accompanying audio 
Individualism 
VS. 
Collectivism
• Assuming Responsibility
• Letting others share
• Sacrificing
• Valuing group success
• Importance of group 
inclusion
Masculine 
VS. 
Feminine
• Meetings are more efficient 
when run by men
• More important for males to 
have career
• Men solve problems with 
logic vs. intuition
• Men solve problems with 
dominant approach
• Pick men as leaders 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance
• Prefer unstructured situations
• Prefer broad guidelines
• Not stressed when outcomes 
cannot be predidcted
• Take risks when outcomes 
cannot be predicted
• Rules should not be broken 
for mere pragmatic reasons
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segment, and two questions. The audio segment was a non-U.S., culturally relevant 
statement about a single person. Each audio segment averaged 5 seconds, but none went 
over eight seconds or under four seconds. Each image included a single person or group 
of people of a single culture. There were an equal amount of stimuli about males and 
females; 30 stimuli for each gender. An image was displayed for eight seconds while the 
audio file played. The image was removed after the audio had completed.  Participants 
were to then answer a question regarding if the person in the image would do a certain 
activity that centered on one of Hofstede’s topics. 
The questions were formulated from half positive and negative perspectives.  
Each image was presented twice, to carefully explore MIB and ToM. The first was a 
question about the others actions, and the second was a question about self. Since both 
MIB and ToM occur when judging or predicting the actions of a third party (i.e. how the 
person in the image would act) it was important to compare the difference between the 
answers (self vs. other). Participants responded to questions–yes or no by left or right 
clicking a computer mouse. Image order was randomized to minimize a learning effect.  
Figure 6 illustrates the order of each stimulus. A sample image can be seen in Figure 7. 
Similarly, the question presented to the participant from the “other” perspective are 
shown in Figure 8 and the “self” perspective in Figure 9. Appendix C includes all stimuli 
used in the experiment. 
 
 
47 
 
 
Figure 6: The order of each stimuli began with an image and a non-US culturally relevant statement about 
the person in the image and then moved into a question on the screen regarding what the person in the 
image is likely to do. Later a question about what the participant would be likely to do appeared on the 
screen.  
 
Figure 7: An example of an image shown in the experiment. This particular image is of a Russian woman. 
The stimuli audio and question would reflect something that her culture would experience. 
 
Figure 8: In the “other” stimuli linked to Petrova’s image it suggests that her family happened to have a 
quality crop even though there was a severe drought. The question about "other" asked the participant if 
they thought Petrova would share her crop with other farmers. 
 
Figure 9: In the “self” stimuli linked to Petrova’s image it again suggests that her family happened to have 
a quality crop even though there was a severe drought. The he question about "self" asked the participant 
if they would share their crop in a similar situation. 
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 As mentioned earlier, each image was tested through the IAPS rating scale; eight 
participants provided results. The images were mapped according to a subjective rating 
on a scale of 1 to 9 of both valence (happiness/unhappiness), where 1 was completely 
unhappy and 9 was completely happy, and arousal (relaxed/stimulated), where 1 was 
completely unaroused and 9 was completely aroused. These ratings were then averaged 
through the different participants and graphed with arousal on the x-axis and valence on 
the y-axis. Ideally, the ratings would be around the center of the graph or in the third 
quadrant – a rating of 5 or less for both valence and arousal – the results of the IAPS test 
can be seen in Figure 10. The IAPS rating was completed so that any physiological 
reaction from participants can be attributed to whether or not the person reacted 
according to MIB presented and not because of the image. Since all the stimuli were 
around the same area, this proves that results were because of the personal biases, not 
because of the impression of the image. 
 
Figure 10: Results of the IAPS rating test on the images show that all the images used in the experiment 
were of approximately the same rating. This showed that results from the experiment were due to 
emotional, or bias, reasons and not due to a reaction to the images. 
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 Testing of the stimuli was done through a Tobii Studio eye tracker system at 
Wright State University (WSU). The study was approved by the WSU Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) and the Surgeon General (SG). The Tobii Studio eye tracker collects 
gaze data with a sampling rate of 120 Hz from an off body camera located on a stationary 
monitor. It was used in conjunction with the Captiv-L7000 system which collected six 
physiological measures: galvanic skin response (GSR), heart rate variance (HRV), 
respiration, skin temperature, electromyography (EMG) of the medial frontalis, and right-
unilateral EMG of the orbicularis oculi.  
 The study used a randomization scheme for the stimuli set presented to each 
participant. Fifteen participants from the ages of 21 to 50 were pulled from the Wright 
State University community. Each participant went through each of the 60 stimuli twice – 
once to ask how the person in the images would act (referred to as “other”) and another 
time to ask how the participants would act in the situation (referred to as “self”). The 
distinction between the answer for how the other person would act versus how the 
participant would act in a situation shows the Mirror Imaging Bias. The timeline that 
each participant experienced during the Tobii experiment is shown in Figure 11. Each run 
of the experiment lasted a little under an hour (give or take). 
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Figure 11: The timeline for each run of the experiment began with an informed consent and pre-
questionnaire. It then lead into the attaching of the physiological sensors and calibration of the eye-
tracker. Each of the stimuli were presented in groups of ten. Once all the stimuli were observed, then the 
sensors were removed and a post-questionnaire was administered. The entire process took a little under 
an hour. 
 Answers provided by the participant (either yes or no) were recorded and 
analyzed. Since both MI and ToM occur when judging or predicting the actions of a third 
party (i.e. how the person in the image would act) it was important to compare the 
difference between the answers (self vs. other). MI is the irrationality in which a person 
perceives and processes information through the filter of personal experience. If the 
participant is experiencing MI while answering how the person in the image would act, 
they would instead answer how they would act in the similar situation. Essentially you 
predict what you would do. Therefore, the tendency and susceptibility for MIB is the 
prevalence or frequency that the participant takes their own perspective when attempting 
to judge a third party. Again, since susceptibility is the percentage of judgments made 
that correspond to the participants own viewpoint, it is critical to determine what the 
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participants viewpoint is. In contrast, ToM is the ability to predict and interpret the 
thoughts and actions of another by taking on their perspective. In the experiment, this 
would be shown by the participant answering the question of how would the person in the 
image act correctly – from their viewpoint. You predict what they would do. 
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IV. RESULTS 
GENERAL RESULTS 
Overall results show that individuals exhibited MIB statistically more frequently 
(p = 0.0006, m. = 40.13%, s.d. = 8.57%) than ToM (m = 21.23%, s.d. = 8.32%). A 
comparison can be seen in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: MIB was enticed almost twice as much as ToM. 
MIB was observed greater in stimuli about females (m. = 48.44%, s.d. = 9.74%) 
compared to stimuli about males (m. = 32.66%, s.d. = 7.98%). This comparison can be 
seen in Figure 13. On a similar note, questions about the different cultures resulted in a 
wide range of MIB enticement, with questions about Germans eliciting the highest (m. = 
64.76%, s.d. = 14.15%) and questions about China eliciting the lowest (m. = 33.81%, s.d. 
= 12.51%). The different culture comparisons can be seen in Figure 14. 
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Figure 13: Questions about females resulted in more susceptibility to MIB compared to males. 
 
Figure 14: Questions about Germans elicited the most amount of MIB. 
Delving further into the susceptibility of participants within each different 
Hofstede’s country classification topic; the bias was shown most frequently in 
Uncertainty Avoidance (m. = 49.00%, s.d. = 11.98%), followed by Masculinity vs 
Femininity (m. = 37.33%, s.d. = 11.31%) and closely shadowed by Individualism vs. 
Collectivism (m. = 35.33%, s.d. = 12.74%). This can be seen in Figure 15. Within each of 
these main topics were sub-topics which can be seen in Figure 16. Full titles of the topics 
can be referenced from Figure 5: Hofstede’s country classification. The “not stressed 
when outcomes can’t be predicted” category had the highest amount of MIB at 65.00% 
(s.d. = 31.05) while the “Men solve problems with logic vs. intuition” category had the 
least amount of MIB at 20% (s.d. = 19.3). 
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Figure 15: Uncertainty Avoidance showed the most amount of MIB in a comparison of each of the topics 
from Hofstede’s Country Classification Scale. 
 
Figure 16: Highest MIB was shown in the “Not stressed when outcomes cannot be predicted” sub-topic. 
Participants were asked what their biggest influence was when unsure about 
answers. The responses fell under the following categories: gut feeling, facial expression 
or demeanor of the person, the assumption that they would do the “right thing,” the 
assumption that the person in the image would do the same thing as the participant, and 
the assumption that the person in the image would follow their respective cultural cues. 
The latter two are key: MIB is the assumption that another person would act the same 
way as you, and ToM is understanding that another person can take an opposing 
viewpoint. Participants who reported answering questions from the stimuli’s culture—by 
definition ToM—exhibited MIB more so than participants who reported the stimuli 
individual would act as the participant would—by definition MIB. This result is contrary 
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to the current paradigm and exemplifies the complexity and criticalness of cultural 
viewpoints. Similarly, it shows that those who are susceptible to the bias, are so 
unknowingly.  
Participants were also asked if the culture of the individuals or groups affected 
their responses. Most of the people responded that yes, it did play a role in their response; 
Figure 17. This supports the hypothesis that culture plays a role in MIB because such a 
large portion of the participants answered according to culture. 
 
Figure 17: Based on the results from a post-questionnaire topic, it shows that culture played a large role in 
the responses that participants gave. 
 
RESPONSE TIME 
A t-test indicated no significance between the levels (MIB/ToM) with respect to 
response time (p = 0.1133). However, a t-test for one participant revealed a significant 
effect - response time was lower for MIB compared to ToM (p = 0.0141). Response time 
for each participant with respect to MIB and ToM can be seen in Figure 18. For 11 
participants– a t-test revealed a significant effect with respect to response time of the self 
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vs. other viewpoints. In all cases, the question worded in the viewpoint of self exhibited a 
response time less than questions worded in the viewpoint of other. Response times for 
each participant with respect to other and self can be seen in Figure 19. P-values that 
showed significance for the t-tests for each participant can be seen in Table 6. Participant 
102 had unusable data and therefore had to be excluded from analysis.  
 
   
Figure 18, left: A LS Means Plot to compare response time of each participant according to MIB and ToM 
shows that there is a general trend that MIB response time is less than ToM response time. 
Figure 19, right: A LS Means Plot to compare response time of each participant according to viewpoint 
shows that the response time of questions about “self” is drastically lower than the response time for 
questions about “other”. 
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Table 6: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for response time. One participant had a 
significant difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to response time. 11 of the participants 
showed significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to response time. 
Participant Compare Significance 
101 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.4970 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0069* 
103 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.1927 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0043* 
104 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.0141* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0553 
106 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.1628 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0262* 
107 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.3842 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P < 0.0001* 
108 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.6932 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0250* 
109 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.0998 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P < 0.0001* 
110 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.9425 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0013* 
111 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.1152 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P < 0.0001* 
112 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.6578 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P < 0.0001* 
113 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.7745 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0976 
114 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.4972 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.2863 
115 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.6421 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0040* 
116 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Response Time P = 0.3240 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Response Time P = 0.0039* 
 
NUMBER OF FIXATIONS 
 An ANOVA and t-test showed no significance between MIB and TOM responses 
when comparing responses between all participants (p = 0.9519). However, when 
comparing MIB and TOM responses within each participant, one participant showed a 
significant effect (p = 0.0109): MIB had a higher number of fixations compared to ToM. 
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A LS Means Plot that displays number of fixations for each participant with respect to 
MIB and ToM can be seen below in Figure 20. Seven participants had a significant 
difference between the number of fixations for questions about other vs. self. A LS 
Means Plot that displays number of fixations for all participants with respect to other and 
self can be seen below; Figure 21. P-values that showed significance for the t-tests for 
each participant can be seen in Table 7. One participant had unusable data and therefore 
had to be excluded from analysis. 
 
Figure 20, left: A LS Means Plot to compare number of fixations for each participant according to MIB and 
ToM did not show any general trend. This is reflected in the t-test which showed no significance in the 
difference between number of fixations for MIB and ToM responses. 
Figure 21, right: A LS Means Plot to compare number of fixations for each participant according to 
viewpoint showed that questions about “other” resulted in a higher amount of fixations. 
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Table 7: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for number of fixations. One individual had a 
significant difference between the number of fixations in MIB and ToM stimuli. There were seven 
instances of participants having a significant difference between number of fixations for self versus other 
stimuli.  
Participant Compare Significance 
101 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.9987 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.8506 
103 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.6883 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.8506 
104 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.5174 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.0001* 
106 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.7060 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.5749 
107 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.0109* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.0028* 
108 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.1852 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.1495 
109 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.1434 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.0282* 
110 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.7716 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.0054* 
111 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.7803 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P < 0.0001* 
112 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.0665 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P < 0.0001* 
113 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.8727 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.1804 
114 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.2959 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.0924 
115 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.8703 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.1299 
116 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Number of Fixations P = 0.5867 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Number of Fixations P = 0.0285* 
 
PUPIL DIAMETER 
 An ANOVA and t-test indicated significance (p = 0.0001) between bias response 
with respect to pupil diameter. Pupil diameter is significantly lower when the participants 
viewed stimuli that elicited MIB responses compared to that of ToM responses. Three 
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participants showed a significant effect between MIB and ToM. In two participants, MIB 
responses had the lower value of pupil diameter and, interestingly, the third had a higher 
diameter.   The average pupil diameters for all participants by bias category can be seen 
in Figure 22. One participant showed significance between pupil diameters in comparison 
to question viewpoint. In this case, questions about self elicited a lower pupil diameter. A 
comparison of each participant’s pupil diameter for the question viewpoints can be seen 
in Figure 23. P-values that showed significance for the t-tests for each participant can be 
seen in Table 8. Two participants had unusable data and therefore had to be excluded 
from analysis. 
 
Figure 22, left: A LS Means Plot to compare pupil diameter for each participant according to MIB and ToM 
seems to show no general trend, although a t-test showed significance. Pupil diameter is significantly 
lower when the participants viewed stimuli that elicited MIB responses compared to that of ToM 
responses 
Figure 23, right: A LS Means Plot to compare pupil diameter for each participant according to viewpoint 
seems to show no general trend. 
 
61 
 
 
 
Table 8: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for pupil diameter. Three participants had a 
significant difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to pupil diameter. One of the participants 
showed significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to pupil diameter. 
Participant Compare Significance 
101 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.0519 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.4876 
103 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.0047* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.8040 
104 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.9580 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.2714 
106 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.5252 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.1446 
107 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.4098 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.2083 
108 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.9716 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.8890 
110 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.0279* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.3005 
111 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.3530 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.0741 
112 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.3583 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.2589 
113 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.5594 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.6979 
114 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.5473 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.0019* 
115 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P < 0.0001* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.3944 
116 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Pupil Diameter P = 0.4817 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Pupil Diameter P = 0.8451 
 
BLINK RATE 
A comparison of the presented bias to blink rate through a t-test showed no 
statistical significance (p = 0.1205). Participant 106 had the lowest average blink rate at 
11.2 blinks per minute and the highest was participant 115 with 29.95 blinks per minute. 
The average bpm for all participants was 17.91 (s.d. 7.05). The blink rates for the 
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participants comparing the different biases can be seen in Figure 24. A t-test comparing 
the viewpoint of the question (self versus other) to the blink rate indicated no statistical 
significance (p = 0.2754). Questions about self had a lower average blink rate (m. = 
17.457, s.d. = 0.583) than questions about other (m. = 18.349, s.d. = 0.571). A 
comparison of each participant’s blink rate for the different question viewpoints can be 
seen in Figure 25. The interaction between the bias and the viewpoint of the question also 
showed no significance on blink rate (p = 0.8237). P-values that showed significance for 
the t-tests for each participant can be seen in Table 9. Five participants had unusable data 
and therefore had to be excluded from analysis. 
 
 
Figure 24, left: A LS Means Plot to compare blink rate for each participant according to MIB and ToM 
shows no general trend. 
Figure 25, right: A LS Means Plot to compare blink rate for each participant according to viewpoint shows 
no general trend. 
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Table 9: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for blink rate. Two participants had a significant 
difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to blink rate. One of the participants showed 
significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to blink rate. 
Participant Compare Significance 
101 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.6100 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.5696 
104 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.9473 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.5500 
106 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.6262 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.8019 
110 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.4161 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.1359 
111 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.9338 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.1488 
112 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.0037* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.1213 
113 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.0452* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.6336 
114 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.8512 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.9080 
115 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.5533 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.6818 
116 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Blink Rate P = 0.9683 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Blink Rate P = 0.0237* 
 
NORMALIZED GSR 
 An example of the GSR output can be seen in Figure 26 for the different 
categories of response: TOM response for both “other” and “self,” and MIB response for 
both “other” and “self.” As seen by this specific example ToM resulted in higher GSR 
measurements. This exemplifies the fact that research has shown that as GSR increases, 
cognitive workload also increases. (Shi, Ruiz, Taib, Choi, & Chen , 2007). 
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 Figure 26: An example of the GSR measurements of an example of MIB and ToM response indicates that 
GSR value was lower over the entire length of a stimuli when participants were viewing a stimuli that 
elicited MIB. 
 
An ANOVA and t-test indicated no significance (p = 0.1211) between MIB and 
ToM response with respect to normalized GSR. Upon further investigation of the data, 
two participants showed a significant effect between MIB and ToM. For one participant, 
MIB GSR was significantly higher. However, for another participant, ToM GSR was 
significantly higher.  Each of the GSR values for the participants comparing MIB and 
ToM can be seen in Figure 27. None of the participants showed significance between 
GSR for question viewpoints. Each participant’s pupil diameter for the different question 
viewpoints can be seen in Figure 28. P-values that showed significance for the t-tests for 
each participant are shown in Table 10. Three participants had unusable data and 
therefore had to be excluded from analysis.  
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Figure 27, left: A LS Means Plot to compare normalized GSR for each participant according to MIB and 
ToM shows conflicting results. However, the general trend – save one participant - shows that GSR was 
lower in stimuli that elicited the MIB compared to stimuli that elicited ToM. 
Figure 28, right: A LS Means Plot to compare normalized GSR for each participant according to viewpoint 
shows no general trend. In fact, several of the participants had opposing results. 
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Table 10: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for GSR. Two participants had a significant 
difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to normalized GSR. None of the participants showed 
significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to pupil diameter.  
Participant Compare Significance 
101 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.8718 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.9799 
102 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.2592 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.3210 
103 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.4043 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.6330 
104 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.0423* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.0971 
106 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.4656 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.3684 
107 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.5991 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.8942 
108 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.3795 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.6239 
110 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.7472 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.7776 
111 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.9707 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.8534 
112 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.5236 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.6610 
113 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.8370 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.9468 
115 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Normalized GSR P = 0.0316* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Normalized GSR P = 0.3484 
 
EMG1 - ORBICULARIS OCULI 
A t-test to compare average EMG for the orbicularis oculi between participants 
showed that many were different from others (p < 0.0001), which is to be expected. 
Average EMG for all participants was 12.649 (s.d. 2.87). A t-test comparing bias result 
(MIB vs. ToM) to the EMG showed no statistical significance (p = 0.2919). EMG of 
MIB responses had a lower average EMG (m. = 12.566, s.d. = 0.128) than ToM 
responses (m. = 12.787, s.d. = 0.165). Each of the EMG values for the participants 
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comparing MIB and ToM can be seen in Figure 29. A t-test comparing the viewpoint of 
the question (self vs. other) to the EMG showed no statistical significance (p = 0.2514). 
EMG of questions about self had a higher average EMG rating (m. = 12.533, s.d. = 
0.143) than questions about other (m. = 12.766, s.d. = 0.143). A comparison of each 
participant’s pupil diameter for the different question viewpoints can be seen in Figure 
30. The interaction between the bias and the viewpoint of the question also showed no 
significance on EMG rating (p = 0.8921). P-values that showed significance for the t-tests 
for each participant can be seen in Table 11. Two participants had unusable data and 
therefore had to be excluded from analysis.  
 
  
Figure 29, left: A LS Means Plot to compare average EMG for each participant according to MIB and ToM 
shows no general trend. In fact, several of the participants had opposing results. 
Figure 30, right: A LS Means Plot to compare average EMG for each participant according to viewpoint 
shows no general trend. 
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Table 11: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for EMG of the Orbicularis Occuli. Two 
participants had a significant difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to EMG of the 
Orbicularis Occuli. The same two participants showed significance when comparing “self” to “other” 
stimuli with respect to EMG of the Orbicularis Occuli. 
Participant Compare Significance 
101 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.9224 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.8984 
102 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.9900 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.9314 
104 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.8518 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.6383 
106 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.8923 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.4931 
107 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.0528 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.9703 
108 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.9848 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.9928 
110 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.9891 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.9243 
111 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.6416 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.7151 
112 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.7671 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.8884 
113 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.8448 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.4644 
114 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.9128 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.5745 
115 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P < 0.0001* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.0258* 
116 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Temple EMG P = 0.0453* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Temple EMG P = 0.0084* 
 
EMG2 - MEDIAL FRONTALIS 
A t-test to compare average EMG of the medial frontalis between participants 
showed that many were different from others (p < 0.0001). Average EMG for all 
participants was 7.802 (s.d. 2.87). A t-test compared the bias result (MIB vs. ToM) to the 
medial frontalis EMG; no statistical significance was shown (p = 0.6680). EMG of ToM 
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responses had a lower average EMG (m. = 7.752, s.d. = 0.146) than MIB responses (m. = 
7.832, s.d. = 0.113). EMG values comparing MIB and ToM for the participants can be 
seen in Figure 31. A t-test compared the viewpoint of the question (self vs. other) to the 
EMG; no statistical significance was shown (p = 0.0875). EMG of questions about self 
had a higher average EMG (m. = 7.955, s.d. = 0.126) than questions about other (m. = 
7.648, s.d. = 0.126). ). A comparison each participant’s EMG for the different question 
viewpoints can be seen in Figure 32. The interaction between the bias and the question 
viewpoint also showed no significance on EMG rating (p = 0.9453). P-values that 
showed significance for the t-tests for each participant can be seen in Table 12. Three 
participants had unusable data and therefore had to be excluded from analysis.  
 
Figure 31, left: A LS Means Plot to compare average EMG for each participant according to MIB and ToM 
shows no general trend. 
Figure 32, right: A LS Means Plot to compare average EMG for each participant according to viewpoint 
shows that there is a slight trend where the “other” stimuli has a lower EMG compared to “self” stimuli. 
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Table 12: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for EMG of the Medial Frontalis. One participant 
had a significant difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to EMG of the Medial Frontalis. 
Three of the participants showed significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to 
EMG of the Medial Frontalis. 
Participant Compare Significance 
101 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.6138 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.0001* 
102 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.8427 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.8267 
104 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.8945 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.7552 
106 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.5130 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.2962 
107 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.3154 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.6989 
108 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.5792 
Question Viewpoint  (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.9011 
110 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.5511 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.5412 
111 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.8171 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.3075 
112 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.8891 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.6341 
113 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.9343 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.9722 
114 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P = 0.5556 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P < 0.0001* 
115 
Bias Response   (MIB/TOM) Brow EMG P < 0.0001* 
Question Viewpoint   (Self/Other) Brow EMG P = 0.0160* 
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V. DISCUSSION 
Results and statistical analysis show that MIB is a way humans – knowingly or 
not – mitigate high cognitive workload situations. It is essentially a mental shortcut to be 
able to come to a decision in a faster manner. This is shown most directly in the statistical 
test for response time. Although a t-test indicated there was no significant difference in 
time between MIB and ToM, several participants showed a statistical significance in their 
results. In each of these cases, MIB had a lesser response time than ToM.  In terms of the 
questions viewpoint, questions about the person in the stimuli took a significantly longer 
amount of time. This shows that people spent less time thinking about a response for 
themselves – and that it requires more cognition to understand that another person might 
not necessarily answer in the same manner. 
 Another measure that has been used in relation to cognitive workload has been the 
use of visual measures. Research has shown as tasks became harder, and therefore more 
cognitively involved, that people gaze at figures for much longer (Just and Carpenter, 
1978). Similarly, the location of fixations is important to understand cognitive processes 
and that if one can understand the relationship between the two that they can understand 
fully the cognitive processes. Significance between MIB and ToM in terms of the number 
of fixations was shown in one participant.  In this case MIB had more fixations than ToM 
– suggesting lower overall cognitive workload and therefore are taking “shortcuts” in 
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their decision making process. With respect to the viewpoint of the question in the 
stimuli, a general trend shows that participants had a higher number of fixations when 
looking at questions about “other.”  
In terms of the next measure, pupil diameter, three participants had a significant 
difference between MIB and ToM responses. Research has shown that sustained 
cognitive load was accompanied by sustained pupil dilation. In other words, when a 
person has a high level of cognitive workload they have a likelihood of having a higher 
pupil diameter. Two out of three of the participants had a lower diameter when viewing 
stimuli that elicited MIB, however, one participant had a higher diameter when viewing 
MIB eliciting stimuli. When looking at the general trend of pupil diameter with respect to 
question viewpoint, “self” versus “other” had similar responses.  
The final visual measure, blink rate, had two participants that showed a significant 
difference between MIB and ToM responses. In both cases the MIB responses had a 
lower blink rate. This is reflected in literature that suggests blinks flank periods of change 
in cognitive load (Siegle, Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008) and that blink rate decreased 
during reading tasks (Bentivoglio, Bressman, Cassetta, Carretta, Tonali, & Albanese, 
1997). When looking at the general trend of blink rate with respect to question viewpoint, 
“self” versus “other” had similar responses. 
 Physiological measures have been proven to be good determinants of cognitive 
workload – and may be potentially good determinants of the possibility of MIB. The first, 
GSR has shown that the higher the GSR frequency, the more mentally involved a subject 
is (Nourbakhsh, Want, Chen, 2013). Two participants showed significant difference 
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between MIB and ToM responses with respect to a normalized GSR rating. In one case, 
the MIB GSR was lower than that of ToM. However, in the other participant, the 
opposite was the case. When looking at the LS Means plot, which compares the average 
of each participant, the general trend of the participants showed a lower GSR rating for 
MIB responses. This reflects research in the GSR field and helps to support that people 
are more cognitively involved when following ToM. In terms of the GSR responses with 
respect to the question viewpoint, there was no visible trend.  
In terms of both EMG – of the orbicularis oculi and medial frontalis, both had 
participants that showed significance between MIB and ToM responses. EMG of the 
orbicularis oculi had higher rating than that of the medial frontalis. This can be attributed 
to the different locations. The medial frontalis simply takes the movements when 
participants are doing hard concentration or confusion – movements in which the 
participant would furrow their brow. obicularis oculi not only takes the movement of 
squinting and large movements of the area around the eye, but also normal eye 
movements like blinking. Therefore, measurements of the obicularis oculi have a higher 
rating. One participant showed significance in both EMG locations, and in both cases 
MIB had a significantly lower EMG rating. This supports research that suggests that 
increases in slow-wave EEG have been associated with decreased alertness, and therefore 
decreased cognitive workload (Wright & McGown, 2001). In terms of the EMG of both 
obicularis oculi and medial frontalis, there was no observable trend with respect to the 
viewpoint of the question. 
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The metrics employed in this experiment reinforce the notion that humans exhibit 
MIB in high workload situations.  The observed measures align with prior research. 
Because ToM is the ability to predict and interpret the thoughts and actions of another by 
taking on their perspective. An individual is more mentally involved in order to consider 
both viewpoints and come to the conclusion that another person can take a differing 
viewpoint than themselves. However, in the case of MIB, which is when analysts 
perceive and process information through the filter of personal experience, a person is 
less involved cognitively. This may be due to shortcutting to personal experience rather 
than considering facts presented. Further, it is important to note that MIB is a real-life 
problem, and our experiment has shown that it may occur at a higher rate than ToM. 
CONCLUSION 
“Development of a normative theory of intelligence has been inhibited 
because the lessons of hindsight do not guarantee improvement in 
foresight, and hypothetical solutions to failure only occasionally produce 
improvement in practice” (Betts, 1978, p. 36). 
 Although it is impossible to eliminate all human error; due to the severe 
consequences, it is consequential to assist analysts detect and mitigate situations that may 
lead to erroneous decision making. MIB and ToM were reviewed to investigate their 
roles in analysts’ decision making processes when predicting the future behaviors of an 
enemy. In predicting other cultures behavior, numerous bias may be present. MIB is 
thought to have three possible causes: ToM, a cultural bias, and mindreading. All three 
may be prevalent in the work of analysts. 
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 Through testing, a deeper understanding of MIB has been sought. It is found that 
MIB is enticed 40.1% of the time and Theory of Mind is enticed 21.2% of the time when 
viewing imagery of different cultures. The best measure of MIB and ToM in this 
experiment was average pupil diameter. If this experiment is representative of realistic 
operating environments, analyst pupil diameter may be a good indicator of MIB. 
Although the psychological measures employed in this experiment failed to reach 
significance, additional metrics may provide a more robust understanding of MIB 
occurrences. When delving into individual participants, several showed a significant 
effect between MIB and ToM with respect to the measurements. All of this analysis goes 
to suggest that MIB is a cognitive shortcut people use – whether it’s known or un-known 
– in order to reduce mental workload in an intelligence setting. 
 Considering that analysts have to deal with these biases on a day to day basis – 
especially MIB – it is important to be able to find a way to mitigate the full effects of the 
bias in them. Granted, not all biases are bad. Some, if not all, are used as a mental 
shortcut. If an analyst were to consider all aspects of the data provided – without the use 
of some sort of cognitive heuristic – they would be overwhelmed and unable to complete 
their tasks in a reasonable amount of time. We don’t want to completely eliminate the 
bias, simply alert them to when they might be susceptible to it.  
The research presented and the results from the experiment suggest that the use of 
pupil diameter as an indicator might be a good possibility. A real-time tracking of the 
pupil diameter could help analysts realize when they are falling prey to MIB. In order to 
have a proper implementation, analysts would either have to have a computer that tracked 
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the pupil diameter through the use of cameras, or through the use of glasses that tracked 
the measurement. As mentioned earlier, a lower pupil diameter in our experiment was 
significantly related to the possibility of MIB. In research, a lower pupil diameter has 
suggested a lower cognitive workload. If the pupil diameter of the analyst is decreased to 
a level that is out of a specific range it could potentially alert them to the possibility of 
their susceptibility to the MIB. 
 In the future, bias prevalence in group decision making should be investigated. In 
reality, most analysts don’t necessarily work as a single entity, but rather as a group of 
people analyzing data. Similarly it would be beneficial to investigate the degree other 
cultures exhibit MIB.  Countermeasures shall also be developed because without 
effective countermeasures, biases – as well as other human-based errors – will inevitably 
creep into the intelligence community. Even though modern intelligence communities 
operate out of the public eye, academic institutions may provide the necessary re-sources 
to facilitate incremental advancements similar to our findings that highlight aspects of 
analyst work that can be improved. 
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APPENDIX A: Pre-Questionnaire 
PRE-QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please answer the following questions.  All answers will be confidential. 
  
1. What is your gender? Please circle one:  Male    Female 
2. What is your age? __________ 
3. Are you color blind? Please circle one:  Yes     No 
4. Do you have any type of visual impairment? Please circle one:  Yes     No  
5. How would you best describe your cultural background? Please circle one: 
 African     Arabic     Asian     Caucasian     Hispanic     Other: Please specify_______ 
6. Were your parents or grandparents born in another country? Please circle one:  
Yes     No 
7. Do you feel a close affiliation with another culture? Please circle one:  Yes     No 
If yes, which and why? 
____________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________ 
8. Have you studied another culture?  Please circle one:  Yes     No 
If yes, which and for what purpose? ____________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B: Post-Questionnaire 
POST-QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. What did you use as the predominant cue for finding an answer to the questions asked? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2. When unsure about the answer to the question, what most influenced your decision? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Did you make any assumptions when finding an answer to the questions asked?  
Please circle one:  Yes       No   If yes, what were some assumptions you made?  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Did anything stand out to you in the images? 
Please circle one:  Yes       No  If yes, what in particular stood out to you?  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
5. Were there any distractions in the images? 
Please circle one:  Yes       No  If yes, what were the distractions?  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
6. In the images, did the environment in which the people were in play a role in your answers?    
Please circle one:  Yes       No  Comments: 
 
7. In the images, did the persons’ race play a role in your answers? 
Please circle one:  Yes       No  Comments: 
 
8. In the images, did the persons’ age play a role in your answers? 
Please circle one:  Yes       No  Comments: 
 
9. In the images, did the persons’ culture play a role in your answers? 
Please circle one:  Yes       No  Comments: 
 
10. In the images, did the persons’ name play a in your answers? 
Please circle one:  Yes       No  Comments: 
 
11. In the images, did the persons’ religion play a role in your answers? 
Please circle one:  Yes       No  Comments: 
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APPENDIX C: Stimuli Set 
Picture Audio Other Question Self Question Culture Gender Phrase 
Correct 
Other 
Resp. 
Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism 
Sub Topic: Assume Responsibility 
 
Sergei notices a 
pollution violation 
in the steel mill 
where he is 
employed. 
Is Sergei likely 
to take the 
blame for the 
violation? 
Would you be 
likely to take 
the blame for 
the violation? 
Russia Male Pos Yes 
 
Akiyo notices a 
bookkeeping error 
that his company 
has been making 
for the last 5 years. 
Is Akiyo likely to 
say the error 
was his fault? 
Would you be 
likely to say the 
error was your 
fault? 
Japan Male Neg Yes 
 
Chun, a manger for 
a manufacturing 
company, has 
noticed that lead is 
being put into 
children’s toys. 
Is Chun likely to 
admit to the 
violation? 
Would you be 
likely to admit 
to the 
violation? 
China Female Pos Yes 
 
Valentina realizes 
that she sent a 
large product 
shipment to the 
wrong customer. 
Will Valentina 
let her 
supervisor 
assume 
responsibility 
for the error? 
Would you let 
your supervisor 
assume 
responsibility 
for the error? 
Russia Female Neg No 
Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism 
Sub Topic: Let Others Share 
 
Petrova's family 
farm yielded a 
quality crop 
following a severe 
drought. 
Is Petrova likely 
to distribute the 
crop with 
disadvantaged 
farmers? 
Would you 
distribute the 
crop to 
disadvantaged 
farmers? 
Russia Female Pos Yes 
 
Akimi received a 
bonus for her 
family for 
completing a recent 
project? 
Will Akimi 
choose to 
spend all of the 
bonus on 
herself? 
Would you 
choose to 
spend all of the 
bonus on 
yourself? 
Japan Female Neg No 
 
Etsuo, a Japanese 
fisherman, has just 
ended a season 
with a small yield. 
Is Etsuo likely to 
share his 
meager 
earnings with 
his extended 
family? 
Would you 
share your 
meager 
earnings with 
your extended 
family? 
Japan Male Pos Yes 
 
Cheng, after trying 
for years, finally 
won 1,000 yen in a 
Chinese lottery. 
Will Cheng 
purchase gifts 
for friends? 
Would you 
purchase gifts 
for friends? 
China Male Pos Yes 
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Picture Audio Other Question Self Question Culture Gender Phrase 
Correct 
Other 
Resp. 
Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism 
Sub Topic: Sacrifice 
 
Mitsuo's work is 
crucial to the 
success of the 
construction 
company he works 
for. 
Will Mitsuo 
relocate to 
ensure the 
successful 
construction of 
a skyrise? 
Would you 
relocate to 
ensure the 
successful 
construction of 
a skyrise? 
Japan Male Pos Yes 
 
Fu has been an elite 
member of the 
Chinese Republican 
Army for several 
years. 
Will Fu reject a 
classified 
position that 
would prevent 
him from 
having a 
family? 
Would you 
reject a 
classified 
position that 
would prevent 
you from 
having a 
family? 
China Male Neg No 
 
Fang enjoys going 
to the Tianjin 
University, but her 
family is struggling 
to harvest this 
year's crop. 
Will Fang likely 
quit attending 
the University 
to return 
home? 
Would you quit 
attending the 
university to 
return home? 
China Female Pos Yes 
 
Anya is training to 
become a 
cosmonaut, but her 
mother is struggling 
to care for her 
ailing father. 
Is Anya likely to 
continue her 
training to 
become a 
cosmonaut? 
Would you 
likely continue 
your training to 
become a 
cosmonaut? 
Russia Female Neg No 
Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism 
Sub Topic: Value of Group Success/ Well-Being 
 
Dimitri's schooling 
is beginning to 
negatively impact 
his employer's 
productivity. 
Will Dimitri 
likely stop his 
education? 
Would you 
likely stop your 
education? 
Russia Male Pos Yes 
 
Alexi and his close 
friends have 
recently become 
radicalized by an 
Eastern bloc militia. 
Will he lose 
interest in his 
career in favor 
of the militia's 
agenda? 
Would you lose 
interest in your 
career in favor 
of the militia’s 
agenda? 
Russia Male Pos Yes 
 
Chiya, a key 
employee at an 
accounting firm, 
just received a job 
offer from a larger 
firm. 
Will she accept 
the offer, even 
if her current 
firm will suffer? 
Would you 
accept the 
offer, even if 
the current firm 
would suffer? 
Japan Female Neg No 
 
Tai, a Chinese 
engineer, notices a 
design flaw one 
week before a 
project is due. 
Is Tai likely to 
ignore the flaw 
and let her 
group continue 
working on the 
problem? 
Would you 
ignore the flaw 
and let your 
group continue 
working on the 
problem? 
China Female Neg No 
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Picture Audio Other Question Self Question Culture Gender Phrase 
Correct 
Other 
Resp. 
Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism 
Sub Topic: Importance of Group Inclusion 
 
Youka has recently 
been invited to join 
an elite academic 
society in Tokyo. 
Will Youka lie 
about her job to 
fit in with the 
group? 
Would you lie 
about your job 
in order to fit in 
with the group. 
Japan Female Pos Yes 
 
Hua has just 
transferred 
departments within 
her current 
investment 
company. 
Will Hua speak 
candidly of her 
past co-workers 
to win friends? 
Would you 
speak candidly 
of your past co-
workers to win 
friends? 
China Female Pos Yes 
 
Hao dislikes Indian 
food, but all of his 
coworkers eat at 
the local Indian 
restaurant during 
the week. 
Is Hao likely to 
get lunch at 
another 
restaurant 
instead of 
where his 
coworkers eat? 
Would you get 
lunch at 
another 
restaurant 
instead of 
eating with 
your co-
workers? 
China Male Neg No 
 
Andrei lives in a 
small farming 
village and has just 
received a job offer 
in Moscow. 
Is Andrei likely 
to accept the 
offer and leave 
his family and 
friends behind? 
Would you 
accept the offer 
and leave your 
friends and 
family behind? 
Russia Male Neg No 
Main Topic: Masculinity vs. Femininity  
Sub Topic: Meeting efficient when run by men 
 
Yin attends several 
corporate meetings 
on a weekly basis 
for her research 
position. 
Is Yin likely to 
feel the 
meetings she 
leads are most 
productive? 
Would you be 
likely to think 
the meetings 
she leads are 
the most 
productive? 
China Female Neg No 
 
Tung is an assertive 
and ambitious 
employee at his 
factory where he 
manages finances. 
Does Tung think 
that meetings 
are better when 
he leads them 
instead of his 
female 
counterpart? 
Would you feel 
the meetings 
are better when 
he leads them 
instead of his 
female 
counterpart 
China Male Pos Yes 
 
Alejandro is a drug 
manufacturer in 
Mexico city, and 
travels a lot for 
business. 
Will Alejandro 
let his female 
employee lead 
the weekly 
meetings while 
he is away? 
Would you let 
your female 
employee lead 
the weekly 
meetings? 
Mexico Male Neg No 
 
Katsu really enjoys 
volunteering at her 
local dog shelter 
every weekend. 
Does Katsu 
consider the 
weekly meeting 
at the shelter 
effective when 
run by the 
female 
director? 
Would you 
consider the 
weekly meeting 
effective when 
run by the 
female 
director? 
Japan Female Neg No 
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Picture Audio Other Question Self Question Culture Gender Phrase 
Correct 
Other 
Resp. 
Main Topic: Masculinity vs. Femininity 
Sub Topic: Men Solve Problems with Logic vs. Intuition 
 
Yoshimi is having 
unexplainable 
mechanical issues 
with his new 
automobile. 
Will Yoshimi 
pursue 
troubleshooting 
steps to fix the 
issue? 
Would you 
pursue 
troubleshooting 
steps to fix the 
issue? 
Japan Male Pos Yes 
 
Cho is having 
trouble 
determining the 
cause of a problem 
with her cell phone. 
Will Cho keep 
using the phone 
until the 
pattern of 
symptoms 
points to the 
cause? 
Would you 
keep using the 
phone until the 
symptoms point 
to the cause? 
Japan Female Pos No 
 
Jie is a cyber-
engineer for the 
Chinese 
Government who 
spends most of his 
time combating 
hacking. 
Will Jie likely 
use his instinct 
as his dominant 
problem solving 
strategy? 
Would you 
likely use your 
instinct as the 
dominant 
problem solving 
strategy? 
China Male Neg No 
 
Amaya is facing 
constant problems 
managing and 
keeping up with her 
finances. 
Is Amaya likely 
to write a 
computer 
algorithm to 
help resolve the 
problem? 
Would you 
write a 
computer 
algorithm to 
help resolve the 
problem? 
Mexico Female Neg No 
Main Topic: Masculinity vs. Femininity 
Sub Topic: Men Solve Problems with Dominant Approach 
 
Ignacio has been 
having several task 
and interpersonal 
issues with a new 
co-worker. 
Is Ignacio likely 
to confront the 
co-worker? 
Would you be 
likely to 
confront the co-
worker? 
Mexico Male Pos Yes 
 
Carlotta has been 
getting a poor 
reputation because 
her community 
director is 
spreading rumors. 
Will Carlotta 
seek to 
discredit these 
rumors by 
creating some 
of her own? 
Would you seek 
to discredit 
rumors by 
creating some 
of your own? 
Mexico Female Pos Yes 
 
Xing has not been 
sleeping very well 
due to a noisy and 
rude neighbor. 
Will he likely 
seek the help of 
others to help 
him with the 
neighbor? 
Would you seek 
the help of 
others to help 
him with the 
neighbor? 
China Male Neg No 
 
Etsuko is struggling 
to advance in her 
career as a 
paralegal assistant 
in Osaka. 
Will Etsuko 
discuss it with 
her boss and 
ask for a 
promotion? 
Would you 
discuss it with 
your boss and 
ask for a 
promotion? 
Japan Female Neg No 
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Picture Audio Other Question Self Question Culture Gender Phrase 
Correct 
Other 
Resp. 
Main Topic: Masculinity vs. Femininity 
Sub Topic: Pick Men As Leaders 
 
Jiao is employed as 
a seamstress in a 
sewing factory in a 
large Beijing 
district. 
Is she likely to 
apply as a shift-
leader? 
Would you be 
likely to apply 
as a shift-
leader? 
China Female Neg No 
 
Regina is very 
unsatisfied with her 
local civic 
leadership in 
Nogales, Mexico. 
Does Regina 
search for a 
male candidate 
instead of 
running herself? 
Would you 
search for a 
male candidate 
instead of 
running 
yourself? 
Mexico Female Pos Yes 
 
Shen is asked to 
provide feedback 
on two candidates 
for shift manager at 
his factory. 
Is Shen likely to 
provide better 
feedback about 
a male 
candidate? 
Would you be 
likely to provide 
better feedback 
about a male 
candidate? 
China Male Pos Yes 
 
Hiro is competing 
for a manager 
position against a 
female with equal 
experience. 
Does Hiro likely 
believe that he 
is a better 
candidate than 
the female 
candidate? 
Would you 
believe that he 
would be a 
better 
candidate than 
the female 
candidate? 
Japan Male Pos Yes 
Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance 
Sub Topic: Prefer Unstructured Situations 
 
Eduardo has begun 
negotiating and 
acting as a 
mediator for 
quarreling native 
tribes. 
Is Eduardo 
satisfied in 
dealing with 
this chaotic 
situation? 
Would you be 
satisfied in 
dealing with 
this chaotic 
situation? 
Mexico Male Pos Yes 
 
Ernesta was just 
hired as a server. 
On her first day of 
training, she is 
instructed to 
observe other 
servers. 
Is Ernesta likely 
to ask the other 
servers about 
the job 
throughout the 
day? 
Would you ask 
the other 
servers about 
the job 
throughout the 
day? 
Mexico Female Neg No 
 
Diedrich is traveling 
to a new region in 
Southern Germany 
for a festival. 
Will Diedrich 
attempt to 
drive to his 
destination 
without getting 
directions? 
Would you 
attempt to 
drive to your 
destination 
without getting 
directions? 
Germany Male Neg Yes 
 
Masako has just 
begun learning and 
practicing the 
ancient craft of 
Okimono. 
Will Masako 
take a hands on 
approach and 
forgo the 
lessons in her 
textbook? 
Would you take 
a hands on 
approach and 
forgo the 
lessons in the 
textbook? 
Japan Female Pos Yes 
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Picture Audio Other Question Self Question Culture Gender Phrase 
Correct 
Other 
Resp. 
Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance 
Sub Topic: Prefer Broad Guidelines 
 
Curt works on a 
mass assembly line 
that does not 
regularly observe 
safety standards. 
Is Curt likely to 
search for new 
employment? 
Would you be 
likely to search 
for new 
employment? 
Germany Male Neg No 
 
Freida was not 
given clear 
instructions for her 
new job at the local 
power plant in 
Munich 
Is Freida likely 
to ask her 
supervisor for 
additional task 
instructions? 
Would you be 
likely to ask 
your supervisor 
for additional 
task 
instructions? 
Germany Female Pos No 
 
Daniela, a 
seamstress in 
Jalisco, received an 
order, but no 
measurements 
were given except 
length. 
Is Daniela likely 
to sew the 
garments 
despite being 
given unclear 
instructions? 
Would you sew 
the garments 
despite being 
given unclear 
instructions? 
Mexico Female Neg Yes 
 
Toshiro's manager 
had to leave the 
office early, and left 
him to finish a 
proposal without 
sufficient 
information. 
Is Toshiro likely 
to consult his 
coworkers to 
gather the 
information to 
complete the 
proposal? 
Would you 
consult your 
coworkers to 
gather the 
information to 
complete the 
proposal? 
Japan Male Pos No 
Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance 
Sub Topic: Not Stressed When Outcomes Cannot be Predicted 
 
Huang is scientist 
who is heavily 
invested in a risky 
research and 
development 
project. 
Does Huang 
second guess 
being over-
stretched 
financially? 
Would you 
second guess 
being over-
stretched 
financially? 
Japan Male Neg No 
 
Ishi was given a 
vague diagnosis of 
her abdominal pain 
by her doctor. 
Will Ishi worry 
about the 
diagnosis to the 
point of 
pursuing a 
second 
opinion? 
Would you 
worry about the 
diagnosis to the 
point of 
pursuing a 
second 
opinion? 
Japan Female Pos No 
 
Luis was informed 
that there will be 
layoffs next month 
at the textile 
factory where he 
works. 
Is Luis likely to 
go on about his 
work and life as 
usual, despite 
the warning of 
layoffs? 
Would you go 
on about your 
work and life as 
usual, despite 
the warning of 
layoffs? 
Mexico Male Neg Yes 
 
Olga learned that 
the sausage she 
served her family 
last week may have 
been part of a 
contamination 
recall. 
Is Olga likely to 
pursue 
additional info. 
about the 
recalled meat 
and its effects 
on her family? 
Would you 
pursue 
additional info. 
about the 
recalled meat 
and its effects 
on your family? 
Germany Female Pos No 
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Picture Audio Other Question Self Question Culture Gender Phrase Correct 
Other 
Resp. 
Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance 
Sub Topic: Take Risks When Outcomes Cannot Be Predicted? 
 
Helga is thinking 
about buying a home 
in Hamburg, but is 
new to home buying 
and renovation. 
Will Helga 
demand an 
inspection 
before buying a 
property? 
Would you 
demand an 
inspection 
before buying a 
property? 
Germany Female Neg No 
 
Ullrich's friend asks 
him if he wants to 
buy stock in a startup 
technology company 
in Munich. 
Is Ullrich likely to 
buy stock in the 
startup without 
extensively 
researching the 
company first? 
Would you buy 
stock in the 
startup without 
extensively 
researching the 
company first? 
Germany Male Pos Yes 
 
Garcia has just been 
offered a slightly 
higher paying job 
several towns away. 
Is Garcia likely to 
accept the job 
offer without 
learning the 
details? 
Would you 
accept the job 
offer without 
learning the 
details? 
Mexico Male Pos No 
 
Hatsumi works for an 
auto maker with a 
program for 
employees to 
purchase refurbished 
vehicles. 
Is Hatsumi likely 
to purchase a 
new automobile 
from her 
company instead 
of a refurbished 
one? 
Would you be 
likely to 
purchase a new 
automobile from 
your company 
instead of a 
refurbished one? 
Japan Female Neg Yes 
Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance 
Sub Topic: Rules Should Not Be Broken for Mere Pragmatic Reasons 
 
Javier has an unfair 
opportunity to see 
his test score before 
other students. 
Will Javier look 
at his scores 
early? 
Would you look 
at your scores 
early? 
Mexico Male Neg No 
 
Akio must wait to 
begin the exam until 
all students receive 
the test booklet. 
Will Akio begin 
the test early? 
Would you begin 
the test early? 
Japan Male Neg No 
 
Consuela is about to 
put money down for 
a home purchase in 
Juarez Mexico. 
Will she likely 
make a low bid 
and run the risk 
of being outbid? 
Would you make 
a low bid and run 
the risk of being 
outbid? 
Mexico Female Pos Yes 
 
Brigetta knows that a 
co-worker is planning 
a surprise party for 
someone in the 
office.  
Will Brigetta 
snoop around to 
figure out the 
details of the 
party? 
Would you 
snoop around to 
figure out the 
details of the 
party? 
Germany Female Pos No 
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